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IS AN ABRIDGMENT AN INFRINGEMENT OF THE
COPYRIGHT OF THE ORIGINAL WORK?
"Many cases [are] to be found in the reports, which decide that
a bona fide abridgment of a book is not an infringement of copyright." It not unfrequently happens that w'hen the foundation of
what is without hesitation taken or asserted as an established
legal principle, is sought for, it is found to be of no more solid a
character than an accumulation of dicta made in the course of a
series of decisions relating to other branches of the same general
subject. There may be in fact not a single case in which the precise point has arisen; and yet dicta on that point been so often
and so broadly and confidently enunciated, that bearing upon their
face the semblance of authority, when the case actually does arise
which calls for a direct and positive decision upon the very question, the judicial mind, misled by appearances, may yield to the
supposed pressure of authoiity, and feel compelred to decide upon
the maxim stare decisis against the bent of its inclination from
reason and principle. It may not be without a practical bearing,
therefore, to examine the grounds for the dictum which stands at
the commencement of this article, and which is to be foind in the
opinion of Mr. Justice Grier in Stowe vs. Thomas, (2 Am. Law Reg.
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210; 2 Wallace, Jr. 547, 566,) where the point before the Court
was, Whether a translation into another language is an infringement of the copyright in the original work, where such original
work is protected by copyright in the same country in which such
translation is printed, published, imported, or offered for sale ?
The most recent case upon the point, is Storyq's Bx'r8 vs. INcombe et al., (4 McLean, 0. C. R. 806,) decided by Mr. Justice
McLean in the Ohio district in 1847. An injunction was sought
by the representatives of the late Mr. Justice Story as holders of
the copyright in his "Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence," to
restrain the defendants from printing and publishing "An introduction to Equity Jurisprudence, on the basis of Story's Commentaries,
etc., by James P. Holcombe." Defence-that the work complained
of was a bona fide abridgment of the Commentaries." In the outset of the opinion the Court state, "the decision must turn on the
question of abridgment ;" and yet by reference to the conclusion of
the opinion, it'will be seen that an injunction was granted against
the first hundred pages of the work complained of, as being a compilation and as such an "infringement of the plaintiff's rights, on the
ground that the plan of the Commentaries is copied; and also for the
reason that the extracts extend bey9 nd the proper limit for such a
work." And this had the same practical effect as an injunction
against the whole book. "The remaining two-thirds of the book
may be comprehended under a liberal construction of an abridgment." There is in this language no positive refusal of an injunction against the remainder of the book on the ground of its being a
fair abridgment and therefore no infringement.
But, although not required by the circumstances of the case
before him, the learned judge decides that a "fair abridgment" is
no infringement. This decision is made solely on the ground of
authority, for he expressly states "the reasoning on which the
right to abridge is founded, seems to me to be false in fact," and he
recognizes the same test of infringement as that suggested by Mr.
Curtis, (Copyright p. 240,) viz: "Is the legitimate tendency of the
act complained of to injure the original author?" He goes on to
state, "But a contrary doctrine has been long established in Eng-
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land; and in this country the same doctrine has prevailed.- *I am,
therefore, bound by precedent; and I yield to it in this instance,
more as a principle of law, than a rule of reason or justice."
What authorities are cited to sustain this position ? First
in point of time is Gyles vs. Wfilcox, (2 Atk. 141, an. 1740),
where an injunction was asked against a work entitled "Modern
Crown Law," alleged to be an infringement of Lord Hale's "Historia
Placitorum Coronm." The injunction was granted on the ground
that the work complained of was a " merely colorable" shortening, by
which "some words out of the Historia are left out only, and translations given instead of the Latin and French quotations that are
dispersed through Sir Matthew Hale's work." In the course of
the decision, however, Lord Hardwicke says, "Abridgments may
with great propriety be called a new book, because not only the
paper and print, but the invention, learning and judgment of the
author is shown in them, and inmany cases are extremely useful,
though in some instances prejudicial, by mistaking and curtailing
the sense 'of the author." This dictum was thrown in merely to
prevent the decision being considered as an authority for more than
the point actually before the Court; a purpose which isdefeated,
if the reservation properly made is to be regarded as an absolute
ruling of the case reserved for decision when it should present
itself. It is true that in Tonson vs. Walker, (8 Swanst. R. 679,)
Lord Eldon, remarks in reply Jo a suggestion in the course of the
argument, "In Gyles vs. Willcox, the abridgment contained 35
sheets, the original 276, it was referred to award, and held a fair
abridgment and not within the Statute." But as Gyles vs. Willcox
was decided in. 1740, and Lord Eldon was born in 1751, he could
not have spoken from any personal knowledge on the subject of
the case, and especially when he was but thirteen years old at the
time of Lord Hardwicke's death. The remark, therefore, must be
taken cum grano salis, and not received as authoritative as to the
final result of Gyles vs. Willcox, when no mention of it subsequent
to the reference, is made by any of the reporters.
An Anonymous Case in Lofft, 775, (an. 1774), is the next authority cited by Mr. Justice McLean. The application was for an
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injunction against Newberry's abridgment of Dr. Hawkesworth's
Voyages, and was heard before Lord Bathurst, whom Lord Campbell, (Lives of the Lord Chancellors, Chap. 52, Vol. 5, p. 336,
Amer. edit.) pronounces "little qualified for intellectual pursuits."
Had it not been for the fact that Sir William Blackstone was consulted upon the case, the intrinsic weight of this authority would be
very little. The ground upon which it is rested is, that "to constitute a true and proper abridgment of a work, the whole must be
preserved in its sense; and then the act of abridgment is an act of the
understanding employed in carryinga large work into a smaller compass, and rendering it less expensive and more convenient both to the
time and use of the reader, which mad e an abridgment in a measure
a new and meritorious work." And, therefore, "An abridgment
when the understanding is employed in retrenching unnecessary
and uninteresting circumstances which rather deaden the narration,
is not an act of plagiarism upon the original work, nor against any
property in the author of it, but an allowable and meritorious
work." If the principle here laid down is a just one, it -would
authorize some of the most barefaced literary thefts. This abridgment would seem from the language of the Chancellor to have
been a mere retrenchment of what was considered by Mr. Newberry
as "unnecessary and uninteresting" matter ; and must, therefore,
be considered as overruled by the late case of Bohn vs. Bogue, (10
Lond: Jur. 420, an. 1846,) where Mr. Hazlitt the editor of "A Life
of Lorenzo de Medici," published by defendant, avowedly founded
upon Mr. Roscoe's "Illustrationsof the Life of Lorenzo de ledici,"
the copyright of whicl was held by plaintiff, "first of all threw overboard as utterly worthless-as of no use whatever to anybody-of
no interest whatever-the greatest part of the work" which he
made the basis of his own publication, but used and copied what he
thought of most value; and an injunction was granted. And the
note of the case of Trusler vs. Murray, (an. 1789, 1 East, 362, n.,)
throws much doubt on the case in Lofft. "In this case though
some parts of the chronological work were different, yet in general
it was the same, and in particular pages 20 to 34 was a literal 'opy.
Lord. Kenyon was of opinion that plaintiff coild recover. Lord
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Bathurst had been of that opinion, and he thought rightly, with
respect to the publication of some original poems by Mr. Mason
with others before published, and the like with respect to an abridgment of Cook's Troyages around the World."
The third and last English case relied upon is Bell vs. Walker,
(1 Bro. 0. C.451, an. 1785.) Passages were read from the two
works to show that the facts and even the terms in which they were
related inthe book against which an injunction was prayed were
taken frequently verbatim from the original work. Sir Thomas
Sewell, Mi. R. said, "If this was a fair bona fide abridgment of the
original work, several cases in this Court had decided an injunction
should not be granted. It had been so determined with respect to
to Dr. Hawkesworth's Voyages. He should not decide at present
whether it were such, or a piracy from the former. But he had
heard sufficient read to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction till
answer and further order." Now the only reported prior case
touching on abridgments in addition to those already commented
upon is Dodsley vs. Kinersly, (Ambler, 403, an. 1761,) in which the
narrative part of Johnson's Rasselas had been published by defendant, omitting the moral reflections. And. Sir Thomas Clark, M. R.,
in delivering his opinion refusing an injunction, says, "What I
materially rely upon is, that it could not tend to prejudice the
plaintiffs when they had before published an abstract of the work
in the London Chronicle." The authority of Bell vs. Walker can
be regarded as of no more weight than can be attached to a dictum
entirely uncalled for by the case before the Court. The case of
Read vs. Hodges, (an. 1740,) is cited in Gyles vs. Villcox as if it
was an authority upon the question with reference to abridgments;
but the infringement complained of was in fact a verbatim reprint
of plaintiff's work, only several pages left out bodily.
The only American authority cited to sustain the position that in
this country the same doctrine has prevailed, is Folsom vs Marsh,
an. 1841, (2 Story R. 106.) The question in this case arose upon
the publication by defendants, of a Life of Washington, which was
alleged to be an infringement of Air. Sparks' Life and Writings of
George Washington. Three hundred and nineteen pages of defend-
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ants' work had never appeared in print before they were published
by plaintiffs, and were reported by the Master to whom it was referred to ascertain the facts (and his report was not excepted to) to
have been copied from plaintiffs' book. And upon this ground, viz:
that parts of the work " imparting to it its greatest, nay, its essential value" were copied from the plaintiffs', an injunction was granted.
"But," says the learned judge, "if it had been the case of a fair
and bona fide abridgment of the work of the plaintiffs it might have
admitted of a very different consideration." And in the preliminary
or introductory part of his-opinion he uses the following language.
"It has been decided that a fair bona fide abridgment of an original
work is not a .piracy of the copyright of the author. But then,
what constitutes a fair and bona fide abridgment in the sense of the
law is one of the most difficult points under particular circumstances,
which can well arise for judicial decision. It is clear, that a mere
selection-a different arrangement of parts of the original work, so
as to bring the work into a smaller compass, will not be held to be
such an abridgment. There must be real substantial condensation
of the materials, and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed there.on; and not merely the faci'e use of t'.e scissors ; or extracts of the
essential parts, constitut ng the chief value of the original work.''
As the case, however, did not call for the decision of the question
now under examination, it cannot be regarded as expressly.ruling
the point; although a dictum of Mr. Justice Story is entitled to
much weight. To sustain this dictum, the cases of Yhittingham vs.
Wooler,' (2 Swanst. R. 428).and Tonson vs. Walker, (3id. 672,) in
addition to the cases of.Dodsley vs. KYinnersley, and Gyles vs. Willcox,
already mentioned, are cited.
WIittingham vs. Wooler was a
case where the defendant had inserted in a periodical work of
theatrical criticism, detached extracts to the extent of six or seven
pages from a farce, the property of the plaintiffs, interspersed with
criticism. It was not pretended or argued that any question as to
abridgment was presented by the case. In Tonson vs. Walker, an
injunction was granted to restrain the publication of Dr. Newton's
Notes to Milton's Poems, notwithstanding a small addition of original commentary by the defendant. It was a case of verbatim copy-
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ing; and yet Lord Eldon travels out of the way to gay, that i"a fair
abridgment would be entitled to protection."
Such are the authorities by which Mr. Justice McLean felt himself bound, contrary to the dictates of his own reason on grounds of
principle. The only remaining cases upon which the dictum of Mr.
Justice Grier in Stowe vs. Thomas can rest, are Butterworth vs.
Robinson, (5 Yes. 709;) and Gray vs. Russell, (1 Story R. 11.)
The report of Butterworth vs. Robinson is exceedingly meagre;
but shows that the work complained of and against which an injunction was granted, was with the exception of leaving out some parts
of the cases, a mere copy verbatimof among others the Term Reports,
of which the plaintiff was proprietor, comprising all the cases published
in that work. There is no discussion of principles in the decision of
the Lord Chancellor as reported; and the case goes no farther than
to decide that a verbatim reprint of parts of an original work cannot
be covered up under the title of an abridgment. In Gray vs. Bussell, it was not pretended that the work complained of was an
abridgment, for so literal had been the transcription that the defendant "incorporated the very errors" of plaintiff's work. ]But
Mr. Justice Story after stating, that "In some cases, indeed, it may
be a very nice question what amounts to a piracy of a work or not;*
and entering into a discussion with reference to extracts for the purpose of criticism and review,-abridgmens,-and Law Reports; says
expressly, "We are spared from any nice inquiries of this sort in
the present case." The point in question did not come up for decision.
It would seem, therefore, from an examination of the authorities,
that there is in reality no case in which the question has been presented for direct decision, Whether an abridgment (no matter how
bona fide) is an infringement of the copyright of the original?Should it then be regarded as finally and definitively settled?
The reason of other judicial minds besides Mr. Justice McLean's,
does not assent to what seems to have been tacitly received as an
established principle. Lord Campbell (Lives of the Lord Chancellors vol. 5. p. 72, Amer. edit.) says, "I must own, that I much question another rule he [Lord Iardwicke] laid down with respect to
literary property, although it has not yet been upset. Gyles vs.

186

AMERICAN PIN CO. vs. OAKVILLE CO.

Willcox, (2 Atk. 142) and see Lofft, 775. I confess I do not understand why an abridgment tending to injure the reputation, and to
lessen the profits of an author, should not be considered an invasion
of his property." When an actual case presenting the precise point
ispresented for judicial determination and expressly decided, it will
be time enough to regard the question as settled by authority.
Till then, however, it must still be regarded as open for discussion.

In the CircuitCourt of the United States for the Hartford Di8trict.
THE AMERICAN PIN COMPANY VS. THE OAKVILLE COMPANY ET AL.

1. The extent of the rights secured to the patentee stated, and the case bf O'eIlly
vs. Horse cited and affirmed.
2. The means specified in the patent to produce the effect, and nothing more, are secured to the patentee, and there can be no infringement unless the same substantial means are used in both the plaintiffs' and defendants' machines.

The facts of this case fully appear in the opinion of the Court,
which was delivered by
J.-The complainants, by their bill seek to enjoin the
defendants from using a machine to paper pins, the right to use which,
they claim to be exclusively vested in them. The foundation of their
claim rests upon two certain patents, the right to which Patents,
with the privilcges by such patents granted, they now have by virtue of assignments from the patentces. One of these patents, was
issued to Samuel Slocum, and bears date the 30th day of September,
A. D. 1841, and was to run for fourteen years from the last mentioned date. The other Patent was issued to John J. Howe, and
bears date the 24th of February, A. D. 1843, and was to run fourteen years from the 5th day of December, A. D. 1852. The validity of these patents is not contested by the defendants. Tijey
admit that the complainants have all the rights which these Patents
purport to grant. They admit further, that they are using a machine for papering pins; but they deny, that by such use, they have
infringed upon any of the rights so granted by such patents.
INGERSOLL,
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The defendants claim a right to use the machine for the papering
of pins, which they are operating, upon the ground that by such use,
they do not infringe upon any rights granted by such patents, or either
of them. They claim also that the right to use such machine, so
operated by them is exclusively vested in them by virtue of a patent granted to Chauncey 0. Crosby, and which.last mentioned patent, they have by virtue of an assignment from the patentee.
There has been heretofore, at times, some diversity of opinion, as
to the extent of the rights, secured to an inventor or discoverer, by
the patent issued in his favor. The Supreme Court of the United
States have however, settled and determined, what rights are so secured to the patentee; so that now, there can be no diversity of
opinion on the subject. In the case of O'1?eilly et al. vs. Morse,
et al. 15 Howard's Reports, page 62, the rule as laid down by the
Chief Justice, in giving the opinion of the Court, is in substance as
I
follows:
He who discovers that a certain useful result will be produced in
any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, by the use
of certain means, is entitltd to a patent for such discovery, provided
he sets forth in his specification, the means he uses to produce such
useful result, in a manner so full and exact, that any one skilled in
the art or business to which it appertains can by using the means
he specifies, without any addition to or subtraction from them, produce precisely the result he describes. And if this cannot be done,
by the means he describes, the patent is void. And if it can be
done then the patent confers on him the exclusive right, to use the
means he specifies, to produce the result or effect he describes, and
nothing more. And it makes no differenoe in this respect, whether
the effect is produced by chemical agency or combination, or by the
application of discoveries or principles in natural philosophy known
or unknown, before his invention; or by machinery acting together
upon mechanical principles. In either case he must describe the
manner and process as above mentioned, and the end it accomplishes. And every one may lawfully accomplish the same end, and
without infringing the patent, if he uses means substantially different from those described. But if the means used to accomplish the
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same end, are substantially like those which the patentee describes,
the patent-has been infringed, and the one using them must be re.
sponsible for such infringement.
The'rules thus laid down must govern -this case' The 'patent
does not secure to th patentee the result or effect produced, !but
only the means described, by vhich such result or effect is produced.
The means which he specifies, to produee the result' or 6ffect,., are
secured, and nothing more. And all other means to~prodfice the
same result or effect and not patented to any one, are bpen to-the
public. A mere change in the form of the machinery, however, or
the means specified, by which the result or effect described is produced; or an alteration in some of the unessential parts, or a substitution or use of known equivalent mechanical powers, not varying
essentially the machine, or its mode of operation or Organization,
will not make the new machine a new invention. The patentee
may however limit his claim, in his specification, to one particular
form of machine, and thus exclude all other forms, tliough such
other forms, would embody his invention, and thereby not secure to
himself, the whole that he has invented. In such a case, he is secured only in the particular form'claimed. The patent law was intended to- secure to the inventor, his whole invention or discovery,
but not unless he claimed to be secured, in the whole. - And if he
claims only a part, or some particular form, such part, or particular
form only is secured to him. No more can be secured by the-patent, than has been invented or discovered;- and'no more can be secured, than is claimed to be secured in the specification.
In the case of "Winansvs. Denmead, 15 Howard, 330. the
substantial means used by the defendant to accomplish the object
sought, were the same as those described and claimed in the specifications-to the plaintiffs' patent. There was no other change, than
a slight change of form not varying in substance the means used by
the plaintiff and set forth and described in the specification to his
patent. And as a mere change in the form of the machinery, or
the means specified, by which the result is produced, not varying
essentially the mode of operation of the thing patented, will not vary
its organization, or be deemed a new or different invention, the de-
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fendant was deemed to have been an infinger of the plaintiffs' rights
secured to him by his patent.
The invention of Slocum as described in-his specification, is a " machine for sticking pins into paper" in a row. It consists of a horizontal plate as described, with as many grooves, as the number of
pins, intended to be stuck in a row; which grooves are of sufficient
length and depth to receive one pin and one only; a sliding hopper
So constructed as to hold, a number of pins, one directly over the
other in a horizontal position, and so made to slide directly over the
gaoves, as to deposite one of thepins in each groove by gravitation;
and A sliding plate or follower, upon the front edge of which pro.
jec t a system of points or wires corresponding with the grooves, so
that when the sliding plate r follower is driven forward, the wires
enter the grooves, in whichithe pins are separated, and drive forward the pins, which are thts made to perforate the previously adjusted folds of a folded and crimped paper, which is held between
clamps. And in the specification Slocum claims as his invention,
the plate with grooves, as described, for separating the pins, the sliding hopper, which deposites the pins in the grooves as described;
and the sliding plate or follower, with the wires attached thereto,
in combination with the groove plate as described, and also these in
combination with the hopper as descrihed.

The invention of Howe

as described in his specification, is for an improvement on Slocum's
machine for sheeting pins, that is, for sticking pins in rows in sheets
of paper. The machine of Slocum did not crimp the paper. But
the paper was crimped in the old way by a separate operation, and
then taken out of the crimping apparatus, and placed in clamps,
and while in such clamps, and out of the crimping jaws, the pins
perforated through the crimps previously formed, and in that way
were sheeted. The improvement of Howe upon the machineof Slocum, crimped the paper, and the pins were stuck in rows in the paper, while the paper was within and held by the crimping apparatus.
This improvement consisted of transverse notches made in the
*crimping jaws of the old crimping apparatus, so that the pins could
enter at proper distances between the crimping jaws, and perforate
the paper, while the same was being crimped. Before this improve-
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mert, no method was knowni by whichi the pins could be made to
penetrate the paper, and thus be sheeted, while the paper was nUder
the process of being crimped. The old mode was to stick the pins
after the paper had been crimped. Howe's improvement was by
means of these transverse notches, to stick the pins, while the paper
was in the crimping process, when it was being crimped, and while
the crimper, which crimped the paper, held the paper in the form
that it was crimped. It was not to sheet the pins, after the paper
had gone through the crimping process, and had passed out of the
crimping jaws. He in substance took the old English crimpinglJ.,
and male transverse notches in it, at suitable distances betweenWthe
jaws, so that the pins could penetrate through these notches, into
and through the crimps of the paper when the paper was within the
crimping jaws, and in the process of being crimped.
The patent which was granted to Crosby, bears date the first day
of April, A. D. 1851. The machine which the defendants are operating, is constructed substantially according to the specifications ;nnexed to that patent. Crosby in his specification claims to be the inventor of" a new and useful machine for sticking pins," and the patent is granted to him accord
his claim for"anew and usfl machine for sticking pins on paper." The specification and claim are not
for an improvement on Slocum's machine, or on Howe's machine
for sticking pins; but for an independent machine, governed by
different principles; for a machine to produce a result, by means.
substantially different from the means secured to either Slocum or
Howe, to produce a like result, to wit, the "sticking of pins on paper." The patent is prima facie evidence, that Crosby has an exclusive right to that which the patent purports to grant; that he is
the first inventor of the machine specified and described in his specifications; that he is the first inventor of an independent machine,
governed by different principles, and using means, substantially
different from the means used by either Slocum or Howe, to produce
the like result. Corning et al. vs. Burden, 15 Howard, 252. The
patent therefore to Crosby affords prima facie evidence, that the
means described by him in his speifications, to produce the result of
sticking pins on paper, are substantially different from the means
described either by Slocum or Howe to produce the like result.
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And the complainants, to succeed in their application, must counteract this prima facie evidence, by sufficient countervailing testimony.
The object of Crosby's machine, is to stick pins in a fillet of paper across. the strip of paper, the crimps being length-wise of the
paper; to crimp the paper in that way, and coil the fillet, when
stuck, into a roll of any convenient size; so that the heads of the
pins will be presented on the disk of the roll, and all by one continued operation. The essential parts of the machine, as operated
by the defendants, or the substantial means by which the desired result of sticking the pins on paper is produced, are crimping rollers,
by which the paper is crimped; an inclined channel way formed by
two bars, by which the pins are made to slide down in a verticle
position, hanging by their heads, between the two bars; a
revolving screw, one end of which is placed at the bottom of the
channel way, and by revolving, at each revolution is made to take
inits thread, from the bottom of this channel way, one pin at each revolution, from the body of pins in the channel way, and separate the
same from the body of pins, and carry it by the mechanical force of
the revolution of the separating screw, to the other end of the screw,
to change the pin from a vertical to a horizontal position, and at the end
of the screw to which the pin is carried, to cause it to drop, in a horizontal position into a groove-channel; and a punch at the head of
the pin, as it is dropped into the groove-channel, which by machinery is made to drive the pins forward at regular intervals, as fast as
they drop into the groove-channel, into the crimped paper, after it
has passed out of the jaws of the crimping rollers. When the paper is stuck, it has, in the place where stuck, passed out of the
crimping jaws: and during this operation, one end of the paper is
held in a rigid state by the crimping rollers, and the other end by
the coiling roller. -The paper is stuck on its passage from the crimping rollers to the coiling roller; and as the paper is stuck, it is
coiled into a roll. The machine is automatic, while other machines
known before, are not so.
The object of Slocum was to paper the pins at given specified
distances apart. And tor that purpose, he used a plate, with a cer-
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tain number of grooves in it, into which the pins were placed by certain machinery, and through which grooves the pins were pushed
into the paper. The distances apart, at which the pins were pushed
into the paper were regulated and controlled by the distances of
the grooves in the plate, and by these distances only. And his machine was so organized as to regulate the distances at which the pins
should be separated and stuck into the paper by the distances apart
of the grooves in the plate. This-was a mechanical law of his machine. There is no such mechanical law of the defendants' machine.
As in the machine of Crosby there is only one groove, through
.which the pins are pushed, one at a time, into the paper, the distances
apart at which they are pushed into the paper by his machine, cannot be regulated by any. such mechanical la'w. These distances
therefore are dependent upon some other mechanical rule; upon
some other mechanical organization. In Slocum's machine, these
distances are regulated by one organization. In Crosby's machine
they are regulated by another and different organization. In Siccum's machine, the distances apart of the grooves in the plate, control the manner in which the pins are placed in the paper. In Crosby's
machine, an entirely different organization of the machine controls
the manner in which the pins are placed in the paper.
Before the invention of Slocum, grooves or channels had been
used, in which to place the pins, with the view to push them into
paper, and they had been pushed in, in various ways. The grooves
used by him as the channel to push the pins into the paper, were
also used to separate the pins; as a channel to deposite the pins
one by one in each groove, as they dropped from the hopper, when
the hopper passes over the plate. Previous to his invention, the
separation had been made by hand, and he invented a particular
mode of separation, other than by hand, and set forth in his specification the particular means he used to produce the result.
The plate with grooves as he described it, for separating the pins,
he claimed for his invention. He also claimed the sliding hopper,
which passed over the plate, and deposited a pin in each groove, as
his invention. He also claimed the sliding plate or follower with
the series of wires attached thereto, as described by him, in com-
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bination with his groove-plate as described; and these also in combination with the sliding hopper as described. This is all he did
claim. Grooves, as such merely, through which the pins were pushed
into the paper he did not claim. The object of his machine was,
to separate the pins, from a pile or mass of pins, and place them in
channels at suitable distances apart, to be pushed into the paper,
and then by means of the plate, with the series of wires attached
as described, to push them into the paper.
The instrumentalities or substantial means, in Slocum's machine,
by which the pins are separated from a pile or column, preparatory
to being pushed in the paper, are a hopper, and a bed containing
grooves of the exact size of the barrel of the pin. And to effect
this separation, the hopper must either slide over the plate
with grooves, or the grooved plate must slide or otherwise pass under the hopper. And to enable the pin to be separated, it must
be in the hopper in a horizontal position, or nearly so.-The separation cannot be accomplished by that machine, unless the hopper
slides over the plate, or the plate slides, or in some other way
passes under the hopper. Without one of these operations, the
machine, for this purpose is useless. On'e of these operations is
essential to it. It is not a Slocum machine, for separating, without
one of these operations.
Neither of these operations can be found, either in form or in
substance, in the Crosby machine.-There is no hopper in Crosby's
machine, unless the inclined channel-way, in which the pins hang
by their heads, in a vertical position, be considered as a hopper.
That if it be considered as a hopper, does not move. It is stationary. Of course, it neither slides nor passes over anything. From
the lower extremity of the inclined channel-way, the pins are taken
one by one, by the thread of a screw, while revolving, and while
the pin is vertical, and by force of mechanical power, the pin is
carried in the thread of the screw, to the other end of the screw,
and there deposited by the screw, in a horizontal position in a
groove-channel. The screw while operating, has no motion, but a
revolving motion. During the whole time, it remains in the same
space. It neither moves forward nor back. There is then nothing
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in the machine *hieh, either in form or in substance, has any resemblance or similitude to the sliding hopper, sliding or passing over
the recesses of the plate to receive the pins, as they drop from the
hopper, or recesses for receiving pins, sliding or'passing under a
hopper. While in Slocum's .machine, one of these processes must
take place. And without one of them, a machine for this purpose
cannot be a Slocum machine.
In the Slocum machine the recess of the plate, which receives
the pins separately from the hopper, must be of the exact size of
the barrel of the pin. In-the Crosby machine, the recesses in the
thread of the screw, which receive the pins, and by which they are
transported to the other end of the screw, and which it is claimed,
are a mechanical equivalent for the recess in the plate, with grooves
in Slocum's machine, need not be of the exact depth or breadth of
the barrel of the pin. They may be of any size, provided they
are not sufficiently large to enable the head of the pin to fall
through. The essential means therefore used in Crosby's machine,
to bring about the result, to wit, a separation of the pins from the
pile or column, are substantially different from the means used in
Slocum's machine, to produce the same result. In this respect the
two machines operate differently, and depend upon distinct organizations. The same substantial means are not used in each.
The mode in which the pins are pushed into the paper by the defendants' machine, is by a punch applied to the head of the pins,
after they are deposited by the screw in the grooved-channel, by
which the pins are made, one by one to penetrate the paper,
in and through the crimps. Slocum does not claim as his invention or discovery, the mode generally of pushing pins through
a grooved-channel into paper, by means of a punch applied to the
head of the pin. The state of the arts, as shown to exist prior to
the time of his invention, shows that he could not with success
have made any such claim. His claim is for his plate, with a series
of wires attached in combinatiot with the grooved plate, as described by him, by which combination, a row of pins is stuck by
one operation. The mode therefore, adopted by the defendants in
their machine, is not embraced in Slocum's claim. They have a
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right therefore to use it, notwithstanding the patent granted to him.
From the description already given of the Howe machine, and
of the Crosby machines as exhibited on-the trial, it appears manifest, that the mode of operation of one, as it respects the improvement or invention as claimed by Howe, is different from the mode
of operation of the other. Howe's invention was but an alteration of the old English crimping bar, by the cutting of transverse
notches through the bar, whefe the two jaws meet; to enable the pins
to pass through these notches, and thereby stick the paper, while
it was within the crimping jaws, and while it was being crimped.
The notches or apertures of some kind were an essential means to
effect the result, which Howe designed by his invention. Without
them, his improvement did not exist. There are no notches or
apertures, in Orosby's crimping rollers, and nothing which bears
any resemblance or similitude to them. The pins are stuck, not
when the paper is within the crimping jaws, but after it had passed
out of them. The device of Crosby is essentially different from
that of Howe. The. pins are stuck by Howe's invention while the
paper is within the crimping jaws, by means of notches or apertures
in the crimping bars. No such means are used by Crosby. The
principles of the two machines, in their modes of operation,
and in the means used by each to effect the result accomplished
are different. They are not therefore identical. One is not an
infringement upon the other.
With this view of the case, the decree must be that the complainants' bill be dismissed with costs to the defendants.
In the above opinion Judge Nelson fully concurs.
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Where stock sold by an avowed owner, dealing as owner, turns out afterwards
to be spurious and void, by reason of its having been illegally issued, the purchaser may recover back the pricepaid, though the seller was ignorant of his want

of title.
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2. A pledgce of stock on collateral security, with power to sell at public or private
-sale without notice, und 'to assign coupled with a blank power for that purpose,
who has actually transferred the stock into his own name, stands as to third persons in the light of owner, though himself still subject, it seems, to the pledgor's
right to redeem; and is therefore liable to an action by a purchaser from him for
the price paid, in case the stock turns out spurious.
3. The principles which govern a common law partnership, are in general applicable to a Joint Stock Company, whether incorporated or not, except so far as modified by statute, or special rules of law. The introduction of new members into
such association can, hence, be only authorized by joint consent; but this consent
may be exercised either on each special occasion, or may be delegated to a particular, without power to redelegate it to an individual.. The issue of certificates
of stock in such association, being the introduction thereinto, of new partners,
falls within this principle.
4. Held on the construction of the charter of the New York and New Haven Rail
Road Company, that a resolution of the Board-of Directors of that company, by
which Robert Schuyler was appointed "transfer agent" of its certificates of stock,
was a valid delegation of power, and that certificates of stock issued by Schuyler
as such agent were binding on the Company.
5. The limitation of the amount of capital stock of the Company, in its charter, held
not to prohibit the Board of Directors, nor their agent thus appointed, as regards
third persons, from increasing the number of shares of stock, beyond the proportion between their par value and the capital stock.
6. The registration of certificates of stock in the books of the Company, though
made a pre-requisite to the right of voting or of exercising any control in the management of the Company, is not necessary to a valid title in the stock itself; and
and so the absence of a power to transfer will not affect the rights.of a bona .fide
purchaser of a certificate of stock ; he would thereby only become the equitable
instead. of the legal holder, but with the right to procure a transfer on the books
of the Company.
7. Where a transfer agent appointed by the Directors of an. Incorporated Joint
Stock Company, has fraudulently over issued stock, a director taking such stock
directlyfrom the agent is chargeable with constructive notice, especially where the
fraud would have been discoverable by an inspection of the books of the Company.
But this does not hpply, where he purchases from a bona fide holder; and query,
whether such constructive notice wbuld affect a firm of which the director was a
member.

This action was brought to recover from the defendants the sum
of $25,000, with interest, paid by the plaintiffs, upon a transfer
of 370 shares of stock of the New York and New Haven Railroad
Company. This stock had been pledged to the Bank of Commerce
by the firm of R. & G. L. Schuyler. Various grounds for the de-
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mand are set up in the complaint; but the main question dbpended,
upon the alleged illegality and valueless character of the stocl,
as having been fraudulently and falsely issued,
Messrs. Ketchum and Cr.' W o'od, for Plaintiffs.
Messrs. SRliman and D. Lord, for Defendants.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
, J.-The course adopted in adducing the evidence,
and the arguments of counsels in this cause, have led to the consideration of the validity of the stock of the New York and New
Haven Railroad Company, issued by the late transfer agent, to an
amount exceeding one million seven hundred thousand dollars. I
am now satisfied that the case cannot be decided without passing
upon that question. I approach it with anxiety and distrust. The
interests involved are of startling magnitude, and the questions
grave and novel. An obscure and untrodden field is before me,
and there are no lights kindled by the wisdom and labors of former
judges to mark out the path. Such considerations urge me to a
protracted and deliberate examination; but I shall fulfil a higher
duty to the community by a prompt de6ision, which will speed the
cause upon its way, for the matured determination of the general
term of this Court. I shall consider the case under the following
heads
1. The position and rights of the parties growing out of the
presentment and refusal of the check for $10,000, and the ground
assumed by the Bank of Commerce for such refusal.
2. The facts attending the possession and transfer of the securities held by the bank to the plaintiffs, and the nature and evidence
of the apparent title to the 370 shares of stock made over to them.
3. The ground of the proposition of the defendants, that in point
of fact the transfer made to the plaintiffs, did cover and represent
undoubted stock.
4. Whether the action to recover back the price can be maintained upon the assumption, that the stock acquired was utterly
void, and vested the plaintiffs with no right or interest whatever.
Houm
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5. If such action can be maintained, then: what are the true
rights and position of the holders of such spurious or fabricated
stock in relation to the company.
6. Whether the plaintiffs are chargeable with such notice of the
character of the stock, as will vary any rights wfhich -iinnoent
I I
holders of spurious stock may possess.
1.-Upon the first point of examination the decision is in substance as follows: that no ight attached to the plaintiffs by reason
of the check-of R. and G. L. Schuyler for 810,000, upon the deposit made after the presentment and refusal of payment of such
check. That the right ff the bank to retain the funds in deposit,
accrued on the 3d of June,:-1854, and could not be affected by a
redemand of the check on the morning of the 1st of July.
That this right was not affected or impaired by reason of the
stock notes given upon the loan by the bank being on demand, and
that no express demand was proven; nor by the fact of the baak
being ihi possession of the stock as collateral, as well as having the
money in hand.
2.-Under the second head, the facts attending the possession
and transfer of the securities to the plaintiffs, and the nature and
extent of their apparent title to the three hundred and seventy
shares of stock, the subject of the action, are stated at length;
and are of great importance in determining the rights of the parties in this particular respect, but not necessarily so upon the general and great questions in this cause. A conclusion is, however,'
stated, that in no event could the plaintiffs recover, without allowing
the bank to deduct the $10,000, the amount of the check paid
upon arrangement. The principle of rescission, upon which the
plaintiffs proceed, involves the principle of restitution.
- The fourth subject of inquiry was, whether an action to recover
the amount could be maintained upon the assumption .that the stock
acquired was utterly void, and vested the plaintiffs with no right or
interest whatever. It is in the first place urged, that if this had
been a sale of stock by an avowed.owner, dealing as owner, no other
*arranty of title would have been implied than that the vouchers of
stock were genuine and that the defendants were not cognizant of
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any defect in the title. But in my opinion, this proposition cannot'
be maintained. It is admitted that the general rule, as stated by
Chancellor Kent, is the law of our State; that if the seller is in
possession of the .article, and sells it as his own, and not as agent
for another, and for a fair price, he is understood to warrant the
title; and the opinion of Justice Buller, in Pasley vs. Freeman,
8 T. R. 58i that if the seller affirms the chattel, which is not in
his possession, to be his, he is bound to answer for the title, is
approved of by Chancellor Kent as possessing both good sense and
equity. In MeKey vs. Cocker, 3 Barbour S. Ct. Rep. 326, Justice
Parker critically examines the authorities and sustains the rule thus
expressed. At this period in the progress of the law relating to
trade and commerce, when the represeiftatives of property or
money, like certificates of stock, are so unboundedly dealt with as
the property itself, I see no ground for a distinction between the
possession of a certificate and the possession of a material chattel.
Sir John Leach held that a bill might be sustained for the delivery
of certificates of stock, because they were the evidences of a legal
right, and necessary to constitute the party a proprietor. An action
at law would not give the property, but merely a personal responsi,bility for damages recovered. Doloret vs. -Rothschild, 1 Sim. &
St., 590. The cases of Morley. vs. Attenborough, Welsb., H,
and Gordon, 3 Exch. Rep. 499, and Chapman vs. Speller, 14
Queen's Bench, R. 621, do not shake this proposition. The
question in the former case related to a sale by a pawnbroker.
Evidence of usage was introduced into the cause ; besides, at the -close
of the opinion is the following language: "It may be, that though
there is no implied warranty of the title, so that the vendor would
not be liable for a breach of it to" unliquidated damages, yet the
purchaser may recover back the purchase-money as on a consideration that failed, if it could be shown that it was the understanding
of both parties that the bargain should be -put an end to if the purchaser should not have -agood title. But if tlhere is no implied
warranty of title, some circumstances must be shown to enable the
plaintiff to recover for money had and received. This case was not
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made at the trial, and the only question is whether there is an
implied warranty."
In Ghapma vs. Speller, the question of warranty, or right to
recover, on failure of title to what Was contracted for, did not
arise. This is the language of the Court. The party had bought
only the right which the vendor had acquired at the shetiff's sale.
That was merely the title and interest of, the judgment-debtor.
But the following important authorities are closely applicable to
the present case, as now considered. Jones vs. Ryde, 5 Taunton,
488, was this: The defendants were bill brokers, and possessed of
a navy bill, which purported to have been issued by the Navy Board,
to have been registered on the 13th of July, 1813, and to be pay-.
able on the 15th of October, 1813, drawn on the Treasurer of the
Navy, to Boll & Hobbs, on their order, for the sum of £1,884 16s.
10d. It seems that, on the face of the bill, the property tax was
deducted, showing a result of £1,883 16s. 3d. The bill came into
the hands of the defendants, who procured the plaintiffs to discount
it, and received the avails. It appeared that the bill issued from
the transport office, for £884 "6s. 10d., and before it was discounted, some person had altered it, by prefixing the figure 1 to
the figures 884 and 883 in the several places in which they occurred,
and prefixing the figure 1 to each of the dates of the 7th of July and
5th of October. All the parties were unconscious of the alterations.
The true amount, however, had been paid by the navy office, and
the present action was brought to recover the difference, about
£1,000. The action was for money had and received; and was
sustained. C. J. Gibbs observed: "Both parties were mistaken
in the view they had of this navy bill; the one in representing it
to be a navy bill of this description, viz., genuine ; the other, in
taking it as such. Upon its afterwards turning out that the bill, to
a certain extent, was a forgery, we think he who toQk the money
ought to refund it to the extent to which the bill is invalid. . ..

In

the present case, -the navy. bill is not such as it.purported to be,
and therefore the plaintiff is entitled to recover. A case somewhat
similar very frequently occurs in practice, to which I should not
refer as genuine law, but that it is said by my brother Lens to be
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sanctioned on the authority of a case so decided at nisi p~ius by.
Mlansfield1 Ch. J., Niz: where forged bank notes are taken. The
party negotiating them is not, and does not profess to be, answerable that the Bank of England shall pay the notes; but he is
answerable that the bills are such as they purport to-be. In
Westropp vs. Solonon, 8 Common Bench Rep. 345, the case, as
far as the present question is concerned, was this: A sharebroker and member of the Stock Exchange was employed to sell
",ertain certificates of scrip of the Buckinghamshire, &c., Railroad
Company. He sold the certificates, and handed over the proceeds
to his employer. The certificates were found to be forged, and the
broker, under certain rules of the Stock Exchange, was called upon,
and paid to the purchaser a certain value as for genuine certificates,
which exceeded the 'amount for which he had sold the scrip. For
this amount he brought his action. The employer, under a count
for money paid, deposited in Court the sum he had received as the
avails of the sale. The question arose as to the excess which the
broker had been compelled-. to pay. There was also a count as
upon a promise that the certificates were genuine. It may be
noticed that these regulations of the Board bound its members to
compliance with a resolution like that in question, or to be expelled.
It was held that there could be no recovery on the special count,
there being no promise, express or implied, that the shares were
genuine; that under the account for money received, the broker
could only recover the amount paid by him to his employer, and
that the resolution of the Board could not affect the latter so
as to make him answerable for the excess. In delivering the
opinion, Maule, J., says: "The defendant employed the plaintiff to sell these identical shares, who sold them according
to that employment. The question is, what is the result of
such a sale when the certificates turn out not to be genuine.
There was no fraud or negligence on either side. The certificates were such as to deceive everybody who had anything to
do with them. Still they were invalid. There cannot be a doubt,
then, that the vendees would be entitled to recover back the money
they had paid for them." Nothing has been cited, nor have I dis-
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covered any authority suffcient, to.overthrow or impair these cases.
I cannot seeF why they do not'determine the point"now considered.
Whether the offence is indictable as a-forgery, has been doubted by
able counsel, .but we have the doctrine of Chief Justice Abbott, that
a combination to fabricate shares of a company beyond the stipulated -number, constitutes an offence punishable in a criminal way.
.Rea vs. M&ott, 2 Carr. & Payne, 521.
It is next urged on behalf of the defendants, that they were never
owners; never affirmed themselves to be owners, nor dealt as such in
relation to this stock, but that.throughout, they negotiated aspledgees,
acted as pledgees, and transferred the stock i*n that capacity, and in
no other; that they looked through6ut to the Messrs. Schuyler, the
true owners, for every authorization* and source of their acts, and
obeyed their directons,-and assigned nothing, and professed to assign
nothing, but the miere interest of pledgees, which, on the requisition
of the firm, they were absolutely bound to do. I have been greatly
pressed with the argument, of which this is a brief summary; but,
after much consideration, I think it is not"conclusive. - In the first
place, it is to be remembered that the cashier, on the day of the
known insolvency of the firm;' (the 30th of 'June,) attempted to have
a transfer of the stock made to the president of the bank, and would
have procured it, shad he applied a few minutes earlier. In the next
place, he did effect the transfer on the morning of the 1st of July,
before 11 o'clock, from his own name to that of the president, and
received the new certificate about 12 o'clock, for-870 shares, having
surrendered the two of 200 and 170 respectively. Again, the order
of the firm authorized an assignment of the securities, and the arrangement was consummated by a delivery of the new stock, certificate, with a blank power to the plaintiffs to, transfer, signed by the
president. The law, in respect tothe sale of stock pledged, I take
now to be, that the party, after default, may sell it at auction upon
reasonable notice of the time and place, to the owner. If any other
mode is provided in the contract, that will govern. Brown vs. 2rward, Superior Court, T. R., 497. In both of the notes in question,
the agreement is, that the stock may be sold at the board of brokers, or at public or private sale, at the option of the bank, and
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I have had occasion to see several printed forins,

in which the provision for a sale is the same. Although such a
clause would, I think, be construed to mean a sale to a third person,
yet there can be no legal objection to the pledgee of stock placing
himself, under his power, precisely in the position of a mortgagee
of. land, who takes possession.
I speak of the general law,
not as affected by our statute.
If so, the pledgee holds the
stock, as owner, against every one but the pledgor,. or those under
him, who may have a right to redeem-a right to be enforced
hy calling for the transfer of an equal number of shares. The bank,
in this case, did not exercise its power to sell at public sale, or at
the board of brokers. But it is another question, whether it did not
exercise the power of selling, at private sale, without notice, when
it first caused the transfer to be made, which vested it with every
recognized indication and evidence of ownership~and then transferred thiD stock to the plaintiffs. Again, the reason of allowing a
recovery in cases like these, is, that money was paid for what was
deemed an existing right, and when it is proven to have no existence, the party receiving ought not to retain it. Now, whether he
got the money as pledgee or owner, does nQt appear to be of material consequence in such an aspect of the question. In the case of
Tatman vs. Loback, 1 Duer Rep. 354, the Superior Court treat
the filling up a blank power attached to a certificate of stock, and
delivering them to another, as a conversion of a previous equitable
title into a legal one; and they held that, whether this was done for
the purpose of selling or hypothecating, made no difference as to
therights of a subsequent holder. I conclude that this action would
lie to recover back the sum paid, deducting the-610,000, upon the
assumption of the stock transferred being proven to be void and
valueless.
5.-This cofisideration leads me inevitably to the question as to
what are the rights and position of the holders of such fabricated
stock, in relation to the company. I have before stated that as to the
shares in question, they are plainly portions of this stock, whatever
obscurity may attend the tracing of the rest. I cannot but add my
fixed conviction that a vast mass of the disputed stock can be fol-
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lowed and identified, and I believe that, could 'a competent tribunal
prescribe some few and reasonable rules of appropriation and adjustment, the task would not transcend the power of mercantile
ability to mark the whole. But it is enough in this instance, that
I find these shares stamped clearly and indelibly with the sign of
their birth in a-fraud and fabrication. Is the railroad company and
its innocent stockholders bound for- these shares ? and, if so, what
is the nature and extent of their liability? These are inquiries
which have stirred the mind of the commercial community, in a degree rarely known in this country, and which have evoked the exercise of the highest professional ability and learning in this, and our
sister State of Connecticut, to meet and to solve them. It is unnecessary to enter upon that wide field of investigation, into the
origin and nature of corporations, and the extent of their powers,
over which the learning and reasoning of the able counsel would
lead me. It is sufficient to say that the rules governing the ancient
mmicipal corporations of cities and towns, can shed but little light
upon a question like the present. Such corporations had originally
their rise in the principle of protection of life and property, from
the barons and kings, and watch and ward was the .duty of the
burghers, and the bond of their safety. Particular franchises were
successively won, from fear or favor. They were all inroads upon
feudalism, and were all personal and peculiar privileges. Rise and
Progress of Cities; Smith's Wealth of Nations, vol. 8, page 171,
et seq. But when the increase of trade and commerce led to an
appreciation of the value of a combination of capital and effort"when men, having learned what wonders could be accomplished by
union, began to think that union was competent for everything"(Dr. Channing)-the formation of partnerships began. Joint stock
associations followed. The principle was at first a mere extension
of the essential elements of a partnership to a greater number of
members, with some variations of government. But the perils of
personal responsibility to the members, and the unwieldly machinery of such a body, led to application to the State to give them
the protection of an incorporation.
Through all the judgments
of courts, based upon the doctrines of the common law-
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through all the legislation of England, and of our own andother States, applicable to associations incorporated or otherwise,
we find the great principles of a partnership recognized, changed
indeed, modified, or impaired, but still pervading and discernible.
Confining the inquiry to the most affluent fountain of our law-the
law of England-werfind that joint stock associations were known
before the act of 1719, called the Bubble act; and they were based
upon the principle of partnership, with an attempt to make shares
transferable, and to limit the personal responsibility of members.
That statute'recognized the existence of such companies, and speaks
of their mischievous consequences-that they have attempted to act
as corporate bodies, pfetending'to make their shares in stock transferable, without legal authority by statute or charter from the crown.
The act then provided that all such undertakings and attempts were
void and illegal, and especially the acting, or presuming to act, as
a corporate body, the raising; or pretending to raise, transferable
stock or stocks, or to assign any share, without authority. By section 25th, the act was not to restrain the carrying on of any home
or foreign trade in partnership, in such a manner as had been usually done, or might be done according to law. The transferability
of shares, unrestricted and unregulated, was a blow at the accountability of every member of a partnership, by rendering the tracing
of debtors difficult, and s6metimes impossible to the creditor. Such
a power was, therefore, reserved for- the parliament or the crown.
Aftbr the act, however, the effort was perpetually made to engraft
this principle upon the schemes of joint stock associations, and 'no
less strenuously was it attempted to limit the personal responsibility
of the members to the amount subscribed,.and exempt them from
the demand of creditors. But the courts of justice invariably defeated these attempts, -and fixed upon these joint stock companies
every material attribute of a common law partnership, in the nonassignability of shares, and the absolute personal liability of members. The expression of Lord Eldon was but the echo of a multitude of decisions, that the wealthiest noblemen in the land might
be involved to his last acre, and his last shilling, by a connection
with such a company. In the year 1825, by the Act of 6 Geo. 4
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cap. 91, the Bubble act was repealed, and, for the first time thatI
am aware of, it was provided "That in any other charter thereafter
to be granted by his Majesty, it should be lawful -to provide that
the members of such corporation -should be individually liable in
their persons and property, for the debts, contracts and engagements of such corporation, to such extent as his majesty might
deem fit and declare." It is. sufficient to notice here the policy of
our own State, exhibited in the manufacturing statute of March,
1811, andfound now in the constitution itself, in regard to banking
incorporations.
The personal responsibility of the members was
recognized, although limited to the amount of their.respective shares
of stock, Sess. 34, ch. 37, Constittion of; 1846, art.: 8, sec. 7.
*From the earliest judicial decision in our State to the present time,
companies organized under this act, have been spoken of as mere
partnerships, with some of the privileges and powers of corporations.
lee-vs. Bloom, 19 Johnson, 473; -Bridgesvs. Penniman,
Hopkins, 304.
This view has been followed in a multitude of subsequent decisions
upon the same or similar statutes. It is sufficient to refer to Zargon vs. WM'
Culloh, 2 Denio, 119, which contains -reference to many
of them. In these statutes the right of transferring shares was
given, and the mode left to the by-laws of the company; and in the
general railroad act of our State (Laws of 1850, ch. 140), the points
of assignability and persohal liability are regulated. By the eighth
section, the stock may be transferred in the manner prescribed by
the by-laws of the company, but no shares are transferable until all
the calls have been frlly paid in. By the tenth section, each stockholder is made individually liable to the creditors to an amount
equal to the amount unpaid on the stock held by him for all debts,
until he shall have paid up the whole amount due by him to thecompany; and all are made jointly and severally-liable for debts to
servants and laborers for services performed to the corporation, but
after an execution against the company has been returned unsatisfied. The want of the attribute of transferability in shares of stock
was a consequence of the policy of the English law, founded upon
the principle of partnership. The attempt of joint stock associations
A
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to render shares assignable, was denounced by the law, because it
violated that principle; and the Legislature clothed companies with
the power in opposition to the partnership law, and in doing so imposed certain restrictions and provisions, such as public registrations
of the transfer, to obviate as far as possible the evils which dictated
the common law rule. Details of the provisions upon this subject
in some of the English acts may be found in the case of the Mheltenham R. B. Comp. vs Daniels, 2 R. R. and Canal Cas. 728, and
in ffebblewhite vs. Afer orin, ib. 51. . Still through the whole stream
of authority and principle in relation to illegal companies or companies privilege with an act of inccrporation, the doctrine of partnership is visible. The former were unauthorized, and the latter
statutory partnerships ; but the basis of the association was the same.
Thus in the case of Ashb6y vs. Blackwell, 2 Eden's Rep., 299, a case
of important bearing upon most of the questions here, the plaintiff
was possessed of X1,000 Melthian Bank stock, and employed John
Price, a broker, to receive the dividends for her. Price forged a
power of attorney from her, empowering -him to sell the stock,
which he did to the defendant Blackwell, and the stock was
transferred to the latter on the books of the company. The bill
-was brought for a re-transfer of the stock or satisfaction from
the trustees of the AMelthian Bank. It was agreed that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief, and the question was whether Blackwell
or the bank should bear the loss. A case was made of great carelessness on the part of the secretary, in receiving the forged power
which was not authenticated as the by-laws of the company required. The lord keeper held that a trustee, whether a private
person or body corporate, must see to the' reality of the authority •
empowering them to dispose of the trust money; for if the transfer is made without the authority of the owner, the act is a nullity,
and in consideration of law and equity, the rights remain as before.
That as to Blackwell, he thought it was not incumbent upon him to
inquire into the letter %fattorney, because the letter of attorney in
that and similar cases, was no part of the purchaser's title. The
title was the admission into the company as a partner pro tanto,
he accepting the stock on the condition of the partnership. The

158

KETCHUM vs-..BANK OF COMMERCE.

letter of attorney is only the authority to the company to transfer.
The company ought -to answer for their servants'-gligence.
He decreed, that the stock be replaced in the name of the
plaintiff, and tlat the bank pay Blackwell the amount he had paid
upon the transfer, with interest. So, in Bryant vs. the Waridck
Canal Co., 23 Eng. L.'and Eq. Rep. 91, Dec. 1853, a bill was filed
by a shareholder on behalf of himself and all.others, &e., to recover
money paid into a company-provisionally registered and then abandoned, although an official manager -had been appointed. The bill
was sustained upon. the ground of an ordinary partnership right.

So, in Stevens vs. The South.D evon RailroadCompany, 12 Eng. L.
and Eq. Rep. 229, the principle of partnership was applied on a
very important and complicated case, where a clause in a statute
bearing upon the, question was held directory, and the subject was
considered one of internal management in which a majority .of
partners will decide. And so, in Couro vs. .The Fort Henry Iron
Works, 12 Barbour, 27, the Court say, "The tendency of modern decisions is to assimilate the action, duties and liabilities of
corporations, to those of individuals and commercial partnerships."
But the power to assign shares was a power to introduce new members into the partnership. The assignee was substituted for the assignor, in whole or in part, accordingly as thewhole or a part of
his shares was transferred. The holder of ten shares could inttoduce ten new partners in his place. True, they represented separately, what he represented in the aggregate; the representation
collectively being of the same shares; but yet new partners were
brought in by the will of one party alone. The general system
.adopted in unchartered c6mpanies, was to require a subscription to
the deed of agreement or settlement. But while this was essential
to constitute members among the associates, much less was sufficient to render a person responsible to creditors, And the very
rule and distinction between the parties inter se, and to the world,
was applied to these cases. See Wordsworth 182, Jllaudsley vs.
Le Blanc, 2 Carr. & P. 409 n.; fHarvey vs. flay, 9 B. & 0.
356, and BIlis vs. Smcecl, 5 Bing. 521. Next, it cannot be contested that if a company was chartered with a definite limited capi-
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tal, and nothing was declared respecting the amofint of the shares,.
the company could adjust -them at pleasure; and -could give that
power to the managers or directors. It is equally clear. that the
shareholders could authorize the directors to increase thd number
of such shares; and, if this could not be done by transcending' the
limit of the capital and adding to it, it must be understood as authorized to be done by diminishing the value of the sharks. Cases
can be imagined; cases, I understand, have occurred where such a
method of raising money to meet the exigencies of a corporation,
has been restored to. It will, not do. to say; that it cannot be imagined the stockholders intended to give a power, the effect of which
would be to diminish their own profit. Such an answer might be
made -by a principal in every case of excess of authority. A joint
stock company or a corporation then, if unfettered by express
legislation, has an undoubted right to fix the number-of shares into
which the capital shall be divided, and when fixed, the associates
may subsequently change it; and, if the power is reserved or implied in the articles of association, the directors or trustees may exercise such power. Thus, in the Armsgate Railroad Company vs.
.Mitchell, 6 Railway and Canal Cases, 286, the shares of a company
were originally fixed at £25 a share, and, by a vote of the directors, were reduced to X20 a share. It was held that this was lawfully done. The statute under which it was organized, did not forbid
it. A section of that act prevented any one from being entitled to vote
except he possessed an interest in the capital to the amount of X25.
It was also held that, under the charter the directors had the power.
The Lexington Railroad Comany vs. Chambers, 13 Metcalf, 110,
and the Kennebec Railroad Company vs. Jarvis, 34 Maine Rep.
360, tend to support the same position. I repeat and condense
these propositions, thus: The principles of a common law partnership govern joint stock associations, incorporated or unincorporated,
except so far as modified by the statute, or fixed principles of law.
The introduction of new members into a partnership, is, upon common law doctrine, only allowable upon a joint consent. This joint
consent may be exercised and proven, either by an actual agreement in each particular instance, or by a delegation of the power
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to assent, to a particular body, or to a particular person. If the
delegation is made to a particular body, it may be accompanied, or
not, with authority to that body- to re-delegate -it; and thus the
question is first, whether the members entrusted the -power directly
to a particular officer; and next, if they did not, whether they entrusted it to a clas's of persons, with power of substitution; and
lastly, have the latter made such substitution?
Now, if by a regular chain of devolved power, the authority to
introduce new members into this partnership can be established, if
by *theact and agreement of the stockholders, the evidences of such
membership are placed in the power of an officer to authenticate
and issue,, then a general power or agency has been delegated to
him. And then his abuse or fraudulent exercise of that power will
not prevent the company from being bound. This view meets the
cogent argument of Mr. Wood, upon the nature of the agency in
this case. What was the power delegated to Robert Schuyler, as
transfer agent, and what was its extent ? The first section of the
charter passed 1st May, 1844, constituted Joseph E. Sheffield and
others, naming them, "with such other persons as shall associate
with them for that purpose, a body politic and corporate, by the
name of the New York and New Haven Railroad Company." The
second section provided that the capital stock bhould be two millions
of dollars, with the privilege of increasing the same to three millions, and to be divided into shares of one hundred dollars 'each,
which shall be deemed personal property, and be transferred in such
manner, and at such places, as the by-laws of the company shall
direct. By the third section, the parties who were authorized to
receive subscriptions might make twenty thousand shares subscribed
the capital stock of the company. But if the subscription exceeded
thirty thousand, the same were to be reduced and apportioned in
such manner as should be deemed most beneficial to the corporation.
Under the fourth section, the immediate government and direction
of-the affairs of the company was vested in a board of nine directors
to be chosen by the stockholders. Four of such directors formed a
quorum for the transaction .of business. By the seventh section,
the directors were vested with the power to make by-laws and regu-
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lations touching the disposition and.management of the stock, property, and, estate of the company, not contrary to the charter, or
the laws of the State or of the United States; the transfer of shares;
the duties and conduct of their officers and their servalits; and -all
matters whatsoever, which may appertain to the concerns of such
company." By the twentieth section, the act might be amended,
altered or repealed at the'pleasure of the General Assembly. In
the exercise of the powers conferred by the charter a resolution was
adopted by the stockholders to the following effect-(Book of Records, Nos. 20 and 21) :_" Transfer' and Certificates of StockThe principal transfer office shall be in the city of New Haven, but
transfer agencies may be established in the cities of New York and
Boston, by resolution of the board of directors; and all transfers of
stock at any office shall be made under, and in -compliance with
such rules and regulations, and by such instruments of assignment
and transfer (which need not be under seal) as may from time to
time' be made, ordered and appointed by the Board of Directors.
"Certificates of stock shall be in such form and issued under such
rules and regulations as the Board of 'Directors may from time to
time appoint and direct." The directors adopted the forms of transfers, certificates, and blank powers of transfer, and ordered their
general use. On the 3d of February, 1847, the following resolution was adopted by the directors: "The receipts and certificates
of stock on the books at New Haven, to be signed by J. E. Sheffield,'
as transfer agent; at Boston to be signed by J. E. Thayer & Brother, as transfer agents; at New York to be signed by Robert
Schuyler, as transfer agent." Now, a certificate of stock is a written declaration that the party in whose favor it runs, is entitled to
the shares expressed in it. It is a written admission that such person is a member of the company. The company is a partnership,
except as expressly qualified. The certificate is, therefore, an admission that the person named is a partner. Did there then come
down from the whole body of associates (the stockholders in this
company), a power to Robert Schuyler to declare that the person
mentioned in such certificate was a member ? It seems to me that
the affirmative is made out by the series of acts and resolutions I
11
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have stated. I do not see what .link in this chain ,canbe broken.
Grant this, and the first part of Mr. Wood'a powerful argument is.
overthrown. That was in substance, this: You cannot, by any
rational deduction, imply a power in an agent to do that which it
was totally out of the poiyer of the principal to perform. Yet more
strongly-you cannot imply such power, when the principal was
prohibited by.the express law of the State from doing the act, and
it was a violation of public policy and public law to do it.
The first proposition of this argument is met by what is above
stated, Irrespective of statutory prohibition, there was a power in
the company to admit new members, and that power had been delegated to Robert Schuyler. And then we are led to the next position of the learned counsel. Does the charter or statute law prohibit the act? It is perfectly clear that when the Legislature has
prescribed a limit to the capital of a corporation, a direct increase
of the amount\would be a violation of the compact, and a ground of
forfeiture. In granting corporate privileges, the regulation of the
capital is governed by two considerations-the necessity of raising
an amount sufficient to accomplish the public object, and the forbidding a larger accumulation of money or property in the hands of
one body than is essential for that purpose. For a company then
to trhnscend the fixed amount is to usurp a right to increase the
great element of corporate power, contrary to a fundamental policy
of the- State. But it is not seen how this line of reasoning applies
with the like or with any force to the increase by a company of the
number of its shares, in any manner which leaves the capital precisely as it was before. If as before observed, the charter of a
company had fixed a capital, but was silent as to the number or par
value of shares, the company (or its agents if entrusted with the
power) might adjust and readjust such number or value. If, again,
when the charter, as in this case, directs that there shall be a defined number of shares of $100 each, the associates had agreed to
increase the shares by reducing the par value of what they held by
a given per centage, would that be a violation of the charter such
as to work a forfeiture, or would it be a matter only affecting the
individual members as to their pecuniary interests in the stock?
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We find that under the present charter, there might have been thirty
thousand members of the company. It is not easy to see what'
great rule of public policy is invaded if this number was voluntarily
increased to forty thousand, the limited capital remaining Jhe same.
The effect in the case suggested would be that each stockholder
wpuld. reduce his share, for which he has paid $100, to $75, and
receive his part of future profits upon the latter sum. But it is here
necessary to examine with care a decision of the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts, pronounced by its late distinguished chief justice,
bearing upon this point. The case is that of the Salem Mill Dam vs.
Ropes, 6 Pickering 32, reaffirmed in 9 Pickering 187, and confirmed
in 10 Pickering 147. It must be noticed that this case arose upon
an action against a subscriber for payment ofa call, which was resisted
on the ground that his subscription was conditional, and that such
condition had not been fulfilled. The charter was that the capital
should be $500,000, and the shares 5,000, of $100 each. The directors had attempted to go on with the business of the company
when only 2,687 shares had been subscribed. The Court held the
defendant not responsible for the call, and the line of reasoning was
in substance this : A subscriber has a right to the benefit of the
expectation and possibility that the whole of the capital allowed by
the charter may not be necessary for the object contemplated. If,
then, when the capital is $500,000, and the shares 5,000 and each
share of course $100, should it occur that $250,000 will suffice for
the object, a subscriber for one hundred shares will only be called
on to pay $5,000, or $50 a share. But if the shares are reduced
in number to 2,500, each subscriber for 100 shares must pay $10,000,
or his utmost limit. This wouldbe against the condition of his subscription. Again, every subscriber has a right to calculate upon a
fund. computed to be commensurate with the object, and that each
of the 5,000 shares should be liable to a tax of $100, to produce
that effect. A power to reduce the shares to 1,000, without a
power of taxing them beyond the $100, would be a power to expend $100,000, which might be totally insufficient, and might be
wholly wasted and lost.
Now, it appears to me that it is inaccurate to say that th9se
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cases prove that a reduction of the. number of share's expressed in
a charter, is a violation of that charter. It is correct to say that
they prove that it is a violation or non-fulfilment of a'condition in
the contract, between a subscriber and the company,'the terms of
which contracts ate found in the charter. Then the condition of the
contract may be waived, modified' or insisted upon, at the will of the
subscriber, with the assent of the company. And hence we are, in
each particular case, to ascertain whether such was a cohdition of the
contract, and whether, if it was, it has been waived. "Inthis point of
view the question was regarded by the Court, in the 'case of Eexington and IF. Cambridge Co. vs. Chambers, 13 Metcalf, 311, and in
the Kennebee Railroad Co. vs. Jarvis, 34 Maine Rep. 860. In
the last case the Court says, that the contract there could not have
had reference to any certain number of shares or certain" amount
of capital, as fixed by the charter, and there is no language used
in the contract prescribing the number of shares, or the amount of
the capital. It may be admitted that an increase of the number
of shares, by a reduction of the value of those already issued, by
affecting the amount of the profits of the holders as well as the
actual sum represented, stands upon a similar footing as a reduction of shares which tends to increase his liability or endanger his
advance. But the question still, in each instance, is one of contract and authorization. Upon this question of forfeiture of the
chartei, I have examined the following cases, and the result, in my
judgment, is, that it is at least very doubtful whether the tribunals
of Connecticut, would determine this charter to be forfeited by the
adoption of this stock as part of the stock of the company, by re,ducing the value of the genuine shares in the manner pointed out.
Kellogg vs. The Union Co., 12 Conn. Rep. 7 ; The State vs. The
.Essex Bank, 8 Vermont Rep. 489; Planters'Bank vs. The Bank
of Alexandria, 10 Gill & John. 346; Attorney General vs. The

Petersburg Railroad Co., 6 Iiedell, 456; The People vs. Oakland County Banki. 1 Douglass, 282; State of Mississippi vs.
The Commercial Bank of .Aanchester, 6 Smedes & Marshall,
233. See also the cases in this State, cited in Angell -&Ames,
see. 776, note. There remains one 'point on this branch of the
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case, to which the observations of counsel have been to some extent directed, and that is as to the effect of the possession of a
certificate merely, with or without a power to transfer, annexed to
or accompanying it.
It is conceded, as a rule very general in its extent, that for the
purpose of voting, or exercising any control in the management of
the affairs of such companies, a registration on the books is necessary. Regulations of this nature are somptimes contained in the
charter--sometimes prescribed in by-laws, and in our State directed
by express statute as to various incorporations. It is sufficient here
to refer to ,the general statute as to moneyed corporations,-( 2 R.
S., 596, §*86, 87 and 38,) and the general'Raihoad act adopting
them,,(Laws of,1850, ch. 140, § 5) and to the case of Bosevelt vs.
Brown-i Kernan's Court of Appeals, 152. Again, as a general
rule, it may be stated that such registration is essential to release an
apparent owner from responsibility to the calls or debts of the company. Bayles vs. Blanc 14 Queen's B. Rep. 205; Tynne vs.
-Price3 De Gex & Smales, 310; Adderly vs. Storms, 6 Hill, 626;
Worrallvs. Judson, 5 Barbour's Rep., 210. A certificate of the
ownership of-shares issued to a registered party, is, in truth, an evidence and declaration of a right of property to the shares expressed
in it. The power to transfer, which may be annexed to it is immateri4l as to the party's own title. It serves the office of enabling
him to invest another party with his own absolute right of property
and to obtain his recognition by the company as such. It serves
the purpose of enabling such person to transfer the same right and
interest to another, and so suicessively. But this can be accomplished by any instrument of assignment, and, indeed, by a mere
endorsement on the certificate--CommercialBank of Bu alo vs.

Kartright, 22 Wendell, 362-that the certificate is the substantial
ground and evidence of title and interest; and the power to transfer but an adjunct will, I think, appear from the following decisions.
In Doloret vs. Rothschild, 1 Sim. & St. 590, a bill was sustained
for the delivery of certificates of stock in a loan, for which the
plaintiff had subscribed. In ex parte Barriere, 11 Eng. L. & Eq.
R 128, a party who took a certificate of stock without complying
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with a by-law requiring registration, was held responsible.

In

Newry R; B. Co. vs. Edwards, 2 Exch. Rep. 118, a person under
similar circumstances was considered a shareholder from mere
possessiQn of the scrip. In Cheltenham B. -W. Go. vs. .Daniel,2
Railway Cases 728, and The same vs. Medina, ibid 735 the purchaser of scrip certificates who sought to get himself registered, but
accidentally failed, was held to be a member. In Bagehaw vs. The
Eastern B. W. Co., 6 Railw. and Canal Cases, 152, 166, Chancellor
Wigram stated it as an indisputable proposition that the holders of
scrip certificates in the stock of a company could sustain a bill to
prevent the misapplication of the capital. There was an inchoate
vs.
right in such persons to become general shareholders. In The, Marblehead Co. 10 Mass. Rep. 476, the delivery of -a certificate with an endorsement upon it for valuable consideration, was
held sufficient, and entitled the holder to the interest and title when
the calls were paid in full. In Ashley vs. Blackwell, 2 Eden Rep.
300, where it was held that a company was responsible to a party
whose stock, had been transferred under a forged power, the lord
keeper said that the letter of attorney was no part-of the title, but
only an authority to transfer. The title was an admission into the
company as a partner pro tanto, he accepting the stock on the conditions of the partnership. The letter of the attorney is only the
authority to the company to transfer. And in Tatman vs. Loback,
1 Duer Rep. 354, this Court held that the holder of a certificate,
with a power annexed in blank, could retain the securities for moneys
advanced to the first pledgee of the stock, although the owner had
paid such pledgee in full. The posession of the documents gave the
pledgee an equitable title, which, by filling up the power, he could
convert into a legal one. Indeed, it seems difficult to avoid the
conclusion that, as between immediate parties, a mere delivery of a
certificate as security upon obtaining a loan of money, would bi an
equitable pledge of the stock, equivalent to an equitable mortgage
by a deposit of a loan. See Bussel vs. Russel, 1 Br. C. C. 209;
.Moore vs. Choat, 8 Sim. 508; Welsh vs. Usher, 2 Hill Oh. Ca. 170.
It follows that the holders of certificates, even as I think, without
powers of transfer, are equitably shareholders or members of this corn-
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pany, with a right to authenticate their title by procuring a transfer on
the books. If they do not possess a power of transfer, it will only
be a difficulty of evidence to make out their right. The result then
is that ihe plaintiffs are entitled, under the certificate and power
taken by them from Mr. Stevens, the President of the company, to
be admitted as shareholders in the capital of this company in common with all other shareholders whose rights are admitted or shall
be admitted, and that their right is in proportion to such whole
number of holders allotted upon'a capital of three million of dollars.
It will be seen that this view of the rights of the parties excludes
any right to sue for damages or to sustain any action except upon
the ground of common ownership, unless indeed the company refuse
admission. Whether in such a case a suit for damages, or a mandamus, is proper, I do not consider. Since this opinion was *ritten I
have been referred to the case of exparte Hassinger, 2 Ashmead,
287. That case is strikingly in point, and the line vf reasoning, in
several particulars, similar to that I have pursued.
. 6.-The last subject of consideration raised by the counsel is,
whether these plaintiffs are not so far chargeable with notice of the
,character of this stock, as that upon that ground alone they must
fail in this action. It appears that Mr. Ketchum, one of the plaintiffs, was a director and officer of the company at the time of the
fraudulent entry of the stock, and since; and it is insisted that he
was bound to know the operations of the company, the position of
the books, and that his knowledge is that of the firm. It is, as I understand, admitted that he was a stockholder. The general law which
I have treated as applicable to this case, giveg every partner an
equal right to the control and inspection of the books, and charges
every partner with a knowledge of their contents. Besides, this
right belongs to every corporator by settled rules of law. Rex vs.
Shelly, 3 T. R. 142; Rex vs. Travanion, 2 Chitty's R. 366 n ;
Rex vs. Tower, 4 M. & S. 162. Again by an act passed April
11, 1842. Sess. laws, 1842, Ch. 165, the transfer agent in thi State,
of any moneyed or other corporation existing beyond the jurisdiction of this state, shall, at all reasonable times during the hours of
transacting business, exhibit to any stockholder of such foreign cor-

KETCHUM vs. BANK OF COMMERCE.

poration, when requested by him, the transfer.book. of such foreign
Corporation, and also a "listof the stockholders thereof if in their
power so to do. The second section imposes a penalty-of $250 for
a refusal to make such exhibition. It will not escape attention, that
the fraud in the present case was of the most apparent and glaring
character. On the face of the stock ledger, stood two entries of
the enormous extent of 5,000 shares each; transferring those amounts
from the transfer agent substantially to himself. And on the page
of the ledger referred to in this entry, in the bald debit of 10,000
shares in two items, to the transfer agent. There never was a case
of. more flagrant neglect of all the accessible means of information
than on the part of a director taking stock directly from R. & G. L.
Schuyler. When such a case arises, it will be difficult to avoid the
application of the rule which places a party who has knowledge of a
fraud, or the path to knowledge of a fraud, plainly before him, in
the same position as the criminal himself. In the language of a
judge; who, at least, neverleft a decision or a proposition obscure,
"It will be no public detriment if my decree tends to make the directors of public companies attend to the business of those companies,
and teaches them not to leave the important transa6tions of millions
to undirected clerks and book-keepers." (Lord Noythingtoa, 2 Eden,
303.) If the consequences of the neglect fall upon the director, instead of the company, in the loss of his own demand, the rule will
be yet more equitable in its application than it was in the case before the lord keeper.
I do-not propose to inquire under what if any circumstances, a
stockholder of the company, not a director, may be subject to a similar imputation of constructive notice. The field is wide and the
cases numerous, upon the question of what shall be sufficient to affect the conscience of a purchaser with the consequences of the fraud
of his seller. In the present case it may be doubtful whether the
firm is bound by the constructive knowledge of a member chargeable
upon im as director; but in the next place, the plaintiffs are entitled to shelter themselves under the want o'f notice, implied or actual
in the bank. It does not appear that the bank, in its corporate
capacity, or that any of its officers on its behalf, held stock, so as to
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entitle it to examine the books. I have thug endeavored io discharge my duty in a case more serious and important than any
other which it has been my lot to determine. No one can be more
conscious than myself of my own inability to meet its difficulties and
dissipate its darkness.. No one could bestow more anxious thought
and solicitude to decide it righteously. I humbly trust that the hope
which I have imbibed from the source of all truth and peace may be
realized, and that this fierce struggle may end like the contest for
the wells of-springing water between the servants of Isaac and the
herdmen of Gerar, when the stream of the fountain-of Rehoboth
and.the fruitfulness of the land followed and rewarded the submission of the patriarch.
The complaint must be dismissed with costs.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
OADWALADR vs. MONTGOMERY.

Xoroney's Appeal.
A mortgage in the common form was given to secure moneys covenanted to be
advanced as buildings upon the premises progressed, held, per BLACK, C. J., L wis
and Lownr, JJ.; WooDwAmw & Kxox, JJ. disentienibus1. That the instrument by which the terms of the loan was regulated, need vot be
recorded.
2. That the mortgage had priority of lien over the claims of mechanics, from the
date of its record, and not from the dates of its actual advance.
3. The agreement that the money should be appropriated towards paying for materials and workmanship, neither postponed the mortgage nor required the mortgagee to see to the application of the money..

rom the District Court of Philadelphia.
These were appeals from the distribution of a Sheriff's Sale.
On the 7th of August, 1849, Cadwalader conveyed to Montgomery
by several deeds sixteen lots, each fronting on Wood and Carlton
streets, in the City of Philadelphia, reserving ground rents, which
were the considerationfor the grants.
On the same day, Montgomery mortgaged the premises to Cad-
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-walader by several deeds, to secure bonds conditioned for the payment of the aggregate sum of $12,000.
These bonds a-ad mortgages were in the common form, and payable ih one year, and they were recorded on the same day. Within
one week Montgomery co~mmenced the erection of houses on all of
these lots, and the premises having been sold under Cadwalader's
mortgages, his right to be paid -out of the fund was disputed by
mechanics who had furnished materials, and whose liens Vlated to
the commencement of the buildings.
It was proved that no money was actually loaned at the time the
mortgages were given, but the consideration was an agreement of
the same date between Cadwalader and Montgomery, under seal,
whereby Montgomery agreed td-erect thirty-two houses on the lots,
and Cadwalader agreed to advance to Montgomery, "to be appropriated towards paying for materials and workmanship for the said
buildings, $750 on the houses to be built on each lot." These payments were to be made by instalments of $100 at different stages
of the progress of the work, and $800 when the houses were finished
and release of liens signed. By this instrument it was declared
that these moneys were to be secured by the bonds and mortgages
above mentioned.
This instrument was neither recorded nor in any way referred to
in the mortgage deeds or bonds.
The first payment by Cadwalader was on the 18th of August,
after the work was commenced and the liens of the -mechanics
had attached.
The last instalment of the $12,000 was paid November 5th.
These payments were made without particular reference to the
progress of the work, in part to enable Montgomery to purchase
materials for cash, and a large part of it directly to material men
on Montgomery's orders. Montgomery was himself the builder,
and did the carpenter Work.
The balance due from the Sheriff's sale was less than $10,000
after deducting expenses, and the question was whether the mortgages had priority from their date of record over mechanics' liens
and judgment creditors of Montgomery, whose liens attached before
actual payment of the money.
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Another question was also discussed in the Court below, whether
it was competent for the mortgagee to- object to the validity of
mechanics' liens, after judgment had been recovered upon them.
The judgments having been entered, after all the advances had
been made on the mortgages, but the claims filed were relied- on,
to show liens existing prior to the advances.
These liens were, however, decided in Taylor vs. Afontgomery,
in the Supreme Court, to be well filed.
A demand for an issue was made, and exceptions filed to the
Auditor's report, awarding the proceeds- of sale to the mortgagee.
April 24.-SHARswoo, P. J. delivered the opinion of the District Court.

As the question presented is one of mere law, we see no reason
for sending the case to a jury, if the law be with the plaintiff. Unless the mortgage be totally void as against lien creditors, assuming
that no advance had actually been made upon it before the building
was commenced, the plaintiff has a right to proceed, and we have no
,right to delay him, more especially as the terre-tenant not being a
party to the scire facias on the mortgage, will not be precluded from
taking defence in an action of ejectment -by the sheriff's vendee.
That a mortgage to secure future advances is good between the
parties, nobody disputes; and it is equally well settled that such a
mortgage is not available against subsequent incumbrances, except to
the extent of what may have been actually advanced at the date of
the respective subsequent incumbrances. The reason is that the
mortgagee, before making each advance, is affected by the constructive notice of such subsequent incumbrances afforded by the record.
If he made the advance after such notice, it was at his peril.
But how, when the mortgagee is bound by covenant to make certain
specified advances ?
Notice of subsequent incumbrances will afford no defence to an
action on the covenant. He will be bound notwithstanding such
incumbrances. Cannot, then, a man who has bound himself by a
legal obligation'to pay a certain sum of money for another at a day
certain, secure himself by a mortgage for that sum, which will be
available, from the date of its recording, against future liens ?
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It certainly never has as yet been so decided. So far from it,
the reasoning of the Supreme Court, in Ter ioven vs. Kerns, 2 Barr,
96, is the other way-though it was not, indeed, the point decided-which justified the reporter in Atating it with a qumre in the
syllabus. The point in that case was, whether the mortgagee must have
actual notice, and it was held-that record notice of the junior liens
was enough. Judge Kennedy says, that it is true generally, and
perhaps universally, that the prior, incumbrancer is not bound to
look to the entry of subsequent incumbrances, when the incumbrance
is given to secure the payment of a debt in being, the amount of which
is fixed and mentioned, or as an indemnity against future liabilities,
which may or shall arise from having become bail or surety for the
incumbrancer; and it will be found to have been the ruling, as well
as the concluding reason of the judgment, that he was under no
obligation to make future advances, and that therefore there was no
good reason why he should be regarded otherwise in making future
advances, than if he were making advances to the parties for the
first time.
On principle, if there is an absolute covenant to pay, it is debitum
in presenti solvendum in futuro. Why cannot the debtor accept
such an obligation as actual payment-actual fraud on creditors
being out of the question, and legal fraud being put out of the
question, by the stipulation or understanding that the mortgage
can only be enforced to realize the sums actually advanced. If I
give my bond to a friend, payable in one year, upon which he can
realize the money in the market, surely I can take a mortgage from
him to secure the advance, as much as if I had borrowed the money
myself upon such security, and paid him the money. And how
does such case differ from that now before the Court? Certainly
in form only, if there is any difference, not in the substance of the
thing.
But an attempt has been made to apply the principle of riedley
vs. Hamilton, 17 S. & R. 27, that the registry of an absolute deed,
with an unrecorded defeasance, verbal or written, is not a sufficient
recording to make it available as a mortgage against future liens.
That case did not give satisfaction to the profession, and certainly
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was in conflict with many prior cases. It has been acquiesced in,
however, and is now beyond question the settled law of the land.
Here, however, the security was in form of a mortgage. It was conditioned simply to pay the sum agreeda to be advanced. It is supposed that, not having referred expressly to the covenant, or recited
the terms of that covenant, the record does not truly express the
nature of the transaction; it is likened to a mortgage for a large
sum, with an unrecorded defeasance that it shall be void on the
paymefit of a less sum. C-arbervs. Henry, 6 Watts, 57, is relied
on in support of this view. It is enough to say, that in that case
the mortgage was sustained. There the condition was not to pay
any particular sum of money, but to pay such sums as the mortgagor might, from time to time, owe to the taortgagee, according
to an agreement entered into between the parties, the agreement
not being recorded nor its date given. All that was laid down
was, that the agreement as contained in the record of the lien,
should give all the requisite information of the extent and certai'nty
of the contract, so that a junior creditor might, by inspection of the
record, and by common prudence and ordinary diligence, ascertain
the' extent of the incumlbrance. The case before us is a much
-stronger and better one than that. Here the junior*creditor is
informed of the precise sum constituting the true extent of the
lien, without being driven, as in Garber vs. Hfenry, to an inquiry
in pais oirthe parties to the mortgage.
If the position already taken be a sound one, that the absolute
covenant to advance at a certain time be a present debt, then the
condition was truly and perfectly expressed. It cannot be that
the nature of the transaction, out of which the mortgage grows, or
the character of the value advanced, must be set forth and truly
described. Few mortgages would stand so rigid a test. The -consideration of a mortgage for the purchase.money of land or goods,
is really not so much money paid, but land or goods agreed to be
worth so much money. If I give my note payable at a future
time, and it is accepted as money, that certainly need not be stated
in the record. A failure of the consideration of the mortgage is
an equitable defence in all- these cases. If the title to the land or
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goods fail; if I refuse to pay the note which I gave, and secured
myself by the mortgage; if, in the case before us, the covenantor
had broken his covenant to make the advances, it would doubtless
be a good defence. These cases all stand on the -same footing, and
the same reason exists in all of them, for spreading a full statement
on the face of the record. Such would be the sweeping character
of the principle we are called upon to adopt and apply to this
case. It would uproot many honest securities, and render uncertain mortgages of daily -necessity. and occurrence. For these
reasons we discharge this rule.
September i1.-SHARSWOOD, P. J. Upon a rule to set aside
the levari facias in this case, and let a terre-tenant into defence,
the opinion of the Court was fully expressed upon the validity of
this mortgage, and upon the sufficiency of the record of it, to make
'it available against lien creditors and others. As other parties
now appear, who did not take part then, we have heard these questions re-argued, and with ability; but it has not resulted in producing any change in our opinion.
As this disposes of the whole case, it is unnecessary to examine
the other questions discussed, as to the validity of the liens, and
the demand of an issue thereon.. As, however, one point, the right.
of the Auditor, when there has been a judgment, on a sci.fa. on
a mechanic's lien, to inquire and decide as to the regularity and
validity of the lien, when the question arises between parties, other
than those who were parties, and privies to the judgment, is one of
considerable frequency and importance in practice, we think it
proper to add that we are against the exceptants on .that point.
A judgment may be attacked collaterally before an Auditor, for
fraud or collusion; and if an issue is demanded, he may decide that
it is fraudulent, as to the party impeaching, and exclude it from
the distribution or postpone it.
It is not competent, however, for any third person to attack a
judgment on the ground of error or irregularity, which can only be
taken advantage of by a party-or privy on writ oferror.
When, however, a creditor has a lien prior to the date of the
judgment, and it is claimed that the judgment takes priority of
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him, because rendered upon the debt, which was a lien prior to the
judgment, then it is competent to the creditor holding a lien prior
to the date of the judgment, to discuss the validity of the prior
lien.
A simple case will illustrate the position. A judgment has lost
its lien by the lapse of five years, then another lien is entered, and
afterwards upon a sci.fa. to revive the first judgment, a judgment
of revival is entered, the intervening judgment creditor, purchaser,
or mortgagee, may undoubtedly show that the lien of the revived
judgment was gone, notwithstanding the judgment of revivor.
It does not appear in Lauman's Appeal, 8 Barr, 473, whether
judgments upon the liens were obtained prior or subsequent to the
entry of the judgments, which are called in the report, 8ubsequent.
If they were subsequent, the decision in that case is entirely consistent with the opinion now expressed. We cannot think that the
Supreme Court meant to decide that if a mechanic's claim was not
a valid lien, from a want of compliance with the requisites of the
Act of Assembly-if it was uncertain as to the description-failed
in specifying the date, character and amount of the claim-if it had
not been filed in time-that these defects would all be waived, as
against an intervening creditor, mortgagee, or purchaser, by a
judgment of which he had no notice, and tb which he was no party.
There may be reason for holding, and it is all we can suppose
that the Supreme Court meant to decide, that a man who lends or
pays his money after the judgment, takes subject to the lien of the
judgment, qua judgment, which may have, with great appearance of
justice, the effect given to it of a general judgment, though its lien
may, from the nature of its proceedings, be merely specific. Thus,
a judgment on a sci. fa. on an unrecorded mortgage, may be a lien
from its date, qua judgment. But, surely, a party who had advanced his money before upon the faith that there was no record,
or that the record was insufficient and void, is not concluded by the
subsequent judgment on the sci. fa. to which he was neither party
nor privy. It would be monstrous so to hold. A judgment is evident to all the world that there is such a judgment, with all its
legal effect as a judgment-a debt of record with lien. No mere,
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stranger can object that it is erroneous,.but beyond its legal effect
as -a judgment, as evidence that the debt recovered was due .ten
days, or ten years before, that the debt had a particular quality
or anything else, though, as between the parties, entering into the
very vitality of the judgment, it is not even evidence as against
strangers, much less conclusive of their rights.
Exceptions dismissed.
The case was argued in the Supreme Court,. by:
E. Ingersoll, Lawrence, Porter and He-Elroy, for appdllants, and
McMurtrie and Cadwalader,for appellees.
It was afterwards re-argued on the- qhestion, whether the mortgages were well re6orded, the collateral agreement not having been
recorded.
For appellans.-The record should have contained a'notice of
the true consideration and real state of the title, 4 Kent, "175.
Pettibone vs. -Griswold, 4 Conn. 158; Stoughton vs. _Pasco, 5 ib.
446; Freedly vs. Hamilton, 17 S. & R. 72; Jacques vs. Weecs,
7 Watts, 268. Where the consideration is to secure future advances
this fact must appear, and creditors be able to learn the amount,
Lyle vs. Dzucomb, 5 Bin. 585; -Stewart vs. Stocker, 1 W. 140;
ITrvin vs. Tabb, 17 S. & R. 420, 421, 423; Garber vs. .enry 6'
W. 59.
2d. In the case of future advances,. liens attaching before advance made, have priority, (Ter-ifoven vs. kerns, 2 Barr, 96,) and
this is such a case, for until advances made there was no debt and
no consideration, and until then no lien.
3d. It is the agreement that these mortgages shall be postponed
to mechanics,-there is a stipulation that the money is to be paid
to them and releaies obtained. If it were not so, then the contract
is a fraud on the mechanics' lien law, for the existence of such liens
were contemplated, and intended to be avoided.
For appellee.-That such. a security can be taken and is valid
from its inception, is shown by Shirras vs. Craig,7 Oran. 84 ; L e
vs. Ducomb, 5 Bin. 585,; Parmentier vs. illespie, 9 Barr, 86,
all of which were secirities against future contingent liabilities.
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2. The details need not appear on the record. The statute
requires but tho recording of the mortgage, and the nature of the
liability or debt is immaterial. The record must speak the truth,
and must show that it is a mortgage and the extent of the lien;
nothing more. Lyle vs. Ducomb ; Hamilton vs. Preedly; Cover
vs. Blak, 1 Barr, 493; Gordon vs. Preston, 1.W. 885; Bank vs.
Bank, 7 W. & S. 395; Jacque8 vs. Weeks. This was not such a
case of future advances, as is referred to in the decisions,-those
were optional, here they were on a condition beyond Cadwalader's
control. The distinction is taken in 2 Barr, 96, 99. An undertaking to pay at a future time, is equivalent to actual payment as
a consideration, and this contract and its consequences are thus
secured. This is fully decided in Miller vs. ffowry, 3 Penna. 374;
Ledyard vs. Butler, 9 Paig. 132, 136, 137; Crane vs. -Deming,
7 Conn. 388. .Hubbard vs. &avage, 8 ib. 215. The record of the
mortgage (Mortg. Bk. J. C.p. 74) shows that the agreement referred
to in yle vs. Ducomb was not recorded, though endorsed on the
mortgage. Stewart vs. Stocker, 1 W. 140; Biley vs. Ellmaker, 6
Wh. 545; Edwards vs. Bank, 1 G. & J. 362.
3d. The stipulation for the application of the fund, was for the
better security of Cadwalader. Edwards vs. The Bank. Bat if
any right was thus given to the mechanics, this payment to Montgomery was sufficient. Balfour vs. Willard, 16 Yes. 151, 156;
2 Sug. 35 § 9. tAnd the mechanics have no right but under the
statute, which expressly subjects them to liens then subsisting, and
implies that they examine the record.
The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered by
LowIRi, J.-Montgomery gave to Cadwalader several mortgages conditioned Faltogether for the payment of $12,000, and we
may treat them all as one. Shortly afterwards, Montgomery commenced the erection of several houses on the mortgaged property,
and liens for the work and materials have been filed and judgments
obtained on them, which claim precedence of the mortgage. It
appears that no money had been actually lent to Montgomery on
the mortgage until after the buildings were commenced, but that
12
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its true consideration was a covenant not recorded, by which Cadwalader agreed to advance $12,000, in defined instalments, in order
to enable Montgomery to make the improvements, and that it was
actually advanced in accordance with the covenant.
Does the omission to record the covenant have the effect of postponing the mortgage to the liens for building ? Why should it?
Is it because the consideration of the debt is not set out in the
bonds and mortgage ? The expression of a consideration as such is
never necessary to the validity of sealed instruments. But the
debt expressed in the bonds is the consideration and subject matter
of the mortgage, and as subject matter it was necessary to set it
out, and it is done truly, and the parties have by their contract
created a lien for that very debt.
It is said, however, that it was not properly a debt then owed,
because the covenant which was the consideration of it, had not
then been performed. But this conclusion is very plainly inconsequential ; for a promise to be performed in future, is one of the
most common of all kinds of consideration for a present debt, the
strict legal character of the transaction depends upon the form in
which the parties have invested it, the bonds for the covenant, and the
covenant for the bonds, being each independent debts. How are they
connected? Only by equity. If Cadwalader breaks his covenant,
Montgomery may obtain relief in equity as against the bonds and
mortgage. But he might not need this, for the remedy on the
covenant might be complete..
If equity interferes to change the form given to the matter by
parties, it does so for the purposes of equity, not inequity-to establish the claim according to its spirit, not- to defeat it-to save
-the mortgagor and his creditors from the forfeiture and from the
penalty, and compel the creditor to accept the real debt and interest-to save him and them from any fraud or mistake, and not to
let them gain an advantage by it. The relevancy of Cadwalader's
covenant is therefore only contingent. It might be important as a
ground of equitable relief; but it has no strictly legal connection
with the mortgage. It is entirely irrelevant, except on the allegation that the consideration of the bonds has failed. Here it did not
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fail, and therefore the legal and the equitable aspects of the transaction coincide.
And such a covenant or- collateral agreement as we have here,
has never been required to be recorded. The Acts of Assembly
simply require the recording of the mortgage. True, it was decided in Hamilton vs. JFreedly, 17 S. & R. 70, that when the
mortgage consists of a conveyance with a separate defeasance, the
recording of the conveyance alone is not a compliance with the law,
because by such a record it does not appear as a mortgage transaction. But the sharpness of this principle has been somewhat
inoderated in Jacques vs. Weeks, 7 Watts, 261, by holding such a
record sufficient if the mortgagee is in possession, because this is
notice enough to put people upon inquiry, when they may ascertain
the true character of the claim. Yet such implied notice contains
in it no indication of the terms of the mortgagc. Of the same character is M. &"M. Bank vs. The Bank of Pennsylvania,7 W. & S.
335, where -actual notice of the defeasance supplied the neglect of
recording it. Of course these cases refer to the effect of such matters upon subsequent liens and purchases; for the mortgagor could
not raise the qluestion.
So, in Gaar3ervs. Henry, 6 Watts, 57, the conveyance contained
a condition that it was to be void on the payment of certain sums
of money said to be mentioned in another agreement, but not set
out in the conveyance. It was entirely imperfect as a mortgage,
and in strict law it was absolute, for the condition was void for uncertainty, taking it by itself, and as it was recorded. Yet this.
reference to another instrument was regarded as sufficient in equity
to make that instrument a. part of the conveyance, and thus convert
it into a mortgage ; and therefore in equity it was a recorded mortgage, containing sufficient notice of a defeasance which was substantially unrecorded. And such is the case of Crane vs. Deming,
7 Conn. 388, and there it is said to be sufficient that the defeasible character of the instrument appear, with such information in
relation to it as will direct inquiry, and guide investigation, and
that it is no objection that the inquiries may be difficult to make,
because of the distance of the mortgagor's residence, 7 Conn. 396,
4 Id. 162, 5 Id. 449, 6 Watts, 59.
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The case of Lylte vs. .Ducomb, 5 Binn. 585, is very nearly like
the present one. It was, as'recorded, a mortgage for a sum absolute; but there was an agreement showing that it was for endorsements made and to be made, which agreement* has been ascertained, to have been unrecorded, though this is not noted in the
report of the case. It differs in this, that the endorsements were
made, but not paid before the contesting lien was created. It
was held, however, that the fact that the debt was stated in the
mortgage as absolute when it was not so, and that the collateral
and qualifying agreement was not set out nor referred to, did not
invalidate the lien of mortgage as to subsequent lien creditors ; and
this is the point of its relevancy here. And for this point, the case
of Lyle vs. .Duconb, has become an authority all through the
United States, and has never been doubted. The principle of it is
affirmed everywhere, T Oranch, 34, 50 ; 9 Paige, 132 ; 8 Conn. 219 ;
Paine's C. C. R. 525; 4 Johns. Ch. 64; 1 Pet. 448; 7 Vin.
Ab. 52 ; pl. 8 ; 1 Watts, 140. It is involved in Gordonvs. Preston,
I Watts, 385, where it is decided that the fact that the mortgage
is for a greater sum, than is due, does not avoid it as to the other
lien holders, unless there be fraud; and in all the numerous cases
where mortgages to secure future advances are held to be good, for
in these cases the information is necessarily indefinite and demands
investigation.
It has been supposed that there is a public policy that demands,
that the record of the mortgage shall be more specific than it is in
this case, but the supposition is plainly disproved by the cases
above referred to, and their evidence is.corroborated by the prac.
tice in relation to judgments. Nothing is more common than to
enter judgment for the penalty of bonds, without any notice being
taken of the real debt in any part of the record. Unless where
oyer is craved, the condition is no part of the record, where the old
common law of a record is still adhered to.
In Parmentiervs. Gillespie, 9 Penn. State R. 86, this point was
raised, and it was decided that a judgment confessed for a certain
amount as due, was good, though it was really given for advances
made and to be made, and this as against liens entered before the
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advances were made, if they were made in pursuance of a previous
agreement; and the same principle is involved in Ter-ifoven vs.
Kerns, 2 P. St. R. 96, andin many other cases. 1 Watts, 140, 374;
3 Pa. R 374; 16 Johns. 165; 5 Johns. Ch. 320. It has never
been supposed that sueh a judgment was void because of the neglect
to change the common law form for a record, in order to set out
the equitable conditions on which it was given, and there would not
be much equity in now declaring that the common law and common
customs, and common forms of conveyancing are all wrong. In
New York it has been considered important to have the true state
of such judgments specified, and an Act of the Legislature has
been passed requiring it.
Besides this, an assignment to secure debts is not void because
of its being absolute on its face, 2 Johns. Ch. 283. A pawn or
pledge of any kind is not void because its conditions do not appear.
In debt on bond to secure the performance of conditions, only the
broken conditions appear on the record, yet the judgment for. the
penalty is a lien to secure the performance of others yet remaining
unbroken.
And why should it not be so ? No man deals in real estate on
faith in the liens as recorded, for subsequent facts are continually
changing their true character by payment and otherwise. To direct
inquiry and guide investigation is therefore a main purpose of the
record.
But it is argued that since Cadwalader had not advanced the
money when the buildings were commenced, it ias his duty to see
that it was properly appropriated to pay the builders, and thus discharge their liens.
The least reflection will show, however, that this is only another
mode of stating the proposition which we have already disproved:
for his lien is postponed if its priority is conditioned upon his paying theirs, but we may notice it farther.
We have shown that the record of the mortgage is notice of the
lien which Cadwalader had obtained, and it is therefore very plain
that the builders undertook the work subject to Cadwalader's
rights. In other words, they have no claims upon him, either to
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yield the position which he has obtained, or -to treat with them,
that he may be allowed to maintain it: they can claim no right
under such circumstances, which the owner could not grant.
Cadwalader's covenant binds him to aid the work by advancing
money in proportion to the progress of'the work. But as soon as
the work commenced the builder's liens commenced, and it is
argued that as Cadwalader had then advanced no money, their
liens took precedence of his, and that, of consequence, he was not
bound by his covenant to make advances, and those made after that
were voluntary, and could not cut out the builders' liens.
This argument begins by assuming the proposition which has
already been disproved, that the advances and not the mortgage
created the lien; though the contract with the parties is, with
notice to all the world, expressly otherwise. Itis arguing in a circle, by using the conclusion as a means of proving itself.
Next, the argument makes the commencement of the work, for
which Montgomery had Cadwalader's covenant to aid him, the very
ground of relieving Cadwalader from his covenant. The commencement of the work created a prior lien, and therefore Cadwalader is excused from making his advances until that is removed.
This is to make the contract defeat itself: it makes it void from
the beginning, because it is impracticable : and the houses can
never be erected, because the first shovel full of earth removed,
creates a lien, that shuts down the coffers out of which it is to be
paid for; or the laying of the first floor of joists on these thirty-two
houses, stops their further erection, because it creates a lien that
cuts off the mortgage by which the money was to be supplied.
If the owners of these liens trusted Montgomery without examining the state of the records, the law provides no relief from the
consequences of their negligence, and morality does not demand
that it should, and even charity will not allow it at the expense of
more careful men. If they did examine the records, then they
found the lien of Cadwalader standing good against Montgomery, and
honestly forbids them to cut it out for their profit. If they found
it and still trusted Montgomery without inquiry, then they agreed
to trust him even witl a lien against him of $12,000, and with no

PERRY vs. KING.

apparent means to pay them. If they made iuquiries, then they
learned that he would have $12,000 in hands to pay for the improvements he was making, and they trusted him that he would
appropriate it properly, In no way that we can regad this case
can we perceive that the appellants have any show of equity, to
demand that their claims shall be preferred to the mortgage.
Decree affirmed at the cost of the Appellants.
WOOODWARD

and KNox, JJ. dissented.

Common Pleas, Phladalphia County, Pa., 1824.
PERRY VS. KINLEY.
Under the rules of the Courts of Equity in Pennsylvania, a defendant may by
answer protect himself against discovery, tbrough a denial of the camplainant's
title, to the same extent as he could by plea in England; and he is not deprived
of this right by submittilg unnecessarily to answer some of the interrogatories
of the bill, against which he might also have protected himself.

In Equity.

Exceptions to answer.

THOMPSoN, P. J.-The exceptions taken to the sufficiency of the
answer, are based upon the rulQ of the English Chancery Courts,
that a defendant who submits to answer, must answer fully-at
least so far as to enable the plaintiff to have a decree against him. It
was for a long time an unsettled question whether the defendant
could in his answer deny the plaintiff's right, and refuse the discovery, to which the right, thus denied, alone entitled the defendant.
This manner of pleading -which Lord Eldon, in S7iaw vs. Ching,
11 Yes. 305, styles a sort of illegitimate pleading, and in Somervile vs. Mackay, 16 Tres. 387; speaks of as inconvenient, seems,
to have been abandoned in England, in conformity with the views
of Sir John Leach, V. C., expressed in NTIazeraddo vs. Maitland,
vs. Harrison,4 Mfad. 252, in which the
3 Mad. 66; and in-
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rule that a party cannot by his answer, protect himself from answering, is considered settled. In New York also, this general rule
prevails, to which there are but few well established exceptions.
Bank of Utica vs. Messerecru, 7 Paige, 71.
In those Courts the defendant can object to the discovery sought,
only by demurrer or plea-where, however the case requires an answer to sustain the plea, in order to give the plaintiff the advantage
of such facts as are within the defendant's knowledge, and would
tend to support the plaintiff's case, Thring vs. Edgar, 2 S. & S.,
457; it is sometimes difficult to ascertain the limits to which the
plea and answer axe severally to extend. If the answer disclose
too much, the plea is considered to be overruled, and if not sufficiently full, upon argument of the 'plea, every fact stated in the
bill and not denied by the answer, must -be taken as true-Bohe
vs. .Aogell, 2 Sch. & Yes., 724; Jones vs. -avis, 16 Yes. 262.
To avoid these difficulties, and in order to simplify an abstruse
subject, our Supreme Court, have adopted the form of pleading, so
little regarded in England, and by an express rule permits a defendant to insist upon all matters of defence in his answer, either
in law or to the merits of the bill of which he may be entitled to
avail himself by plea. Whenever a plea will protect him from discovery, his answer will have the same effect. It is not denied that
in the case before us, the defendant might by a plea, have protected'himself from the discovery sought by the interrogatories, to
which it is alleged he has not fully answered. By his -plea he
might have put the plaintiff upon proof of the alleged trust, and
having denied the existence of such trust by his answer, he is
equally protected from the discovery called for. That the defendant
has answered a part of the interrogatories more fully than was
necessary, and thus afforded to the plaintiff 'evidence of facts
which he might have refused to disclose, while he explicitly denies
the principalfactof the trust, cannot under the circumstances of
this case, deprive him of the benefit of the rule of Court. le is
still protected from the discovery Which a plea would have avoided.
The exceptions taken on this ground are therefore overruled.

